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Abstract 
 
 
Housing price dynamics is an important topic in urban economics. Housing plays 
a crucial role in household’s location choice and leads to the sorting of households by 
skills. As one of the most important consumption markets in the U.S., the performance of 
the housing market is closely related to the overall economy. Given these considerations, 
it is important to examine the housing price dynamics and their effects theoretically and 
empirically.  
Essay one focuses on the role of housing prices and wages in allocating people to 
locations with different levels of amenities. Different from the traditional Rosen (1979) 
and Roback (1982) model, we make a more realistic assumption of differential ability 
across households. Using a spatial equilibrium model where households are sorted by 
ability, we find that the standard quality of life estimates are significantly biased with 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
Essay two investigates across metropolitan housing price dynamics. Specifically, 
we examine the effect of amenities on rents, housing prices, and price-to-rent ratio over 
time in response to an income shock using a dynamic general equilibrium model. 
 
Weiran Huang – University of Connecticut, 2014 
 
 
Although households’ marginal utility from increases in amenity levels goes up as 
productivity rises, the increasing returns to productivity with ability make amenities less 
important in the bidding process.  
Essay three studies non-price spillover effects of foreclosure during the crisis, 
which is potentially due to the information or norms that are created by exposure to 
foreclosure of housing units at the neighborhood level. I find no evidence of spillover 
effects of foreclosure after controlling for effects that operate through housing price 
dynamics and systematic patterns of trends in foreclosure at the neighborhood level. 
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Chapter 1 
Quality of Life Estimators with Household Heterogeneity: 
Examination of Quality of Life measures within Rosen-Roback 
Framework in a Spatial Equilibrium Model 
 
 
Abstract:  
Previous studies on the measures of quality of life (QOL) are mainly based on 
traditional Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) model which assumes that households are 
identical in ability across different places. However, empirical studies have shown that 
high-ability workers are actually sorted into those attractive places with high housing 
prices. In this paper, we construct a spatial equilibrium model to evaluate the sensitivity 
of the approach by Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) under the alternative but more 
realistic assumption of differential ability across households. In our model, households, 
sorted by abilities, are matched into places with different productivity and amenity levels. 
Using this model, we calculate the steady state equilibrium allocation of households to 
examine the implication of the standard QOL measures within the framework of Rosen 
(1979) and Roback (1982). Our results suggest that with unobserved heterogeneity, the 
standard QOL estimates are significantly biased. The bias can be narrowed down when 
individual ability differences are a relatively small part of across urban area wage 
differences, a condition that is inconsistent with the existing empirical evidence. On the 
other hand, without unobserved heterogeneity, the standard QOL measures are unbiased 
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if the functional form of indirect utility function satisfies certain special condition, and 
the empirical simulations suggest that the errors are small even when utility functions 
violate those conditions. 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
In recent years quality of life (QOL) has received a great global attention since it 
significantly affects the location choice of households and firms and hence plays a critical 
role in the competitiveness and growth of urban areas. A clear evidence of it can be found 
from the theme of World Expo 2010 (Shanghai, China): "Better City, Better Life”. 
Therefore, correctly measuring QOL is an important topic in urban economics. The 
original concept of QOL dates back to Ricardo (1821), who propose that rent is that 
portion of the produce of the earth, which is paid to the landlord for the use of the 
original and indestructible powers of the soil. The early studies view amenity as an 
economics good mainly because of three reasons that are summarized by Wingo (1973) : 
(1) QOL is scare and people trade it off with other things that make them equally happy 
in order to have it; (2) Households and business make decisions on where to locate based 
on QOL considerations; (3) QOL is public goods, and community resources need to be 
allocated to it. In our simulation of dynamic steady state people sort based on their innate 
ablity, we find that QOL measures are very sensitive to how well one control for 
unobservable human capital. If sorting on unobserved ability is substantial, the resulting 
QOL estimates can be the reverse of the true quality of life. 
However, the quantification of QOL remain unsolved until Rosen (1979) and 
Roback (1982) define QOL indexes using weighted sum of implicit prices of 
amenities/local attributes. They build a general equilibrium model wherein workers and 
firms compete for scare land. When the labor market and housing market clear, there 
exist unique equilibrium wage and rent so that marginal consumer and marginal firm are 
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indifferent to their location choices. The implicit price of amenities and other local 
attributes can be inferred from the compensating differential in wages and rents. 
Particularly, wages are relatively higher to allow workers enjoy more market 
consumptions that offset their loss in QOL in places with relatively lower amenities, or to 
compensate the expensive living costs in places with higher rents. In practice, the implicit 
prices of amenities are obtained from the estimated coefficients of the city specific 
characteristics using hedonic wage and rent regressions. 
Within the framework of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) model, there has been 
a great effort to obtain good QOL estimates using various theoretical and empirical 
approaches. Beeson and Eberts (1989) develop an approach to estimate productivity and 
amenity components of wage differentials for individual standard metropolitan statistical 
areas. Their results show that difference in productivity and amenity are roughly the same 
in explaining wage variation across the sample. Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn (1988) 
improve QOL estimation by incorporating the conceptual innovations of productivity 
agglomeration effects with respect to different size of urban areas. Their findings imply 
that local amenities have been substantially capitalized into labor market. Gyourko and 
Tracy (1991) find an important effect of government services and taxes on the local labor 
and land market, which reveals the feasibility of controlling over by government. In order 
to reduce the reliance of QOL on relatively noisy wage hedonics, Stover and Leven (1992) 
estimate QOL in a single housing expenditure hedonic using a wage premium 
 5 
 
1
( )
ij
j
jj ij
W
L
p E W
= ∑
 
1  as a regressor to capture the indirect impact of amenity on land 
rentals and feedback from the labor market. Albouy (2008) incorporate federal taxes, 
non-housing costs and non-labor income into Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) model, 
achieving QOL estimates with three features: (1) they successfully predict how housing 
costs rise with wages levels, (2) they are positively correlated with popular “livability” 
rankings and stated preferences, and (3) they do not decrease with city size. 
All or most of the above studies on QOL estimates use hedonic wage and housing 
expenditure equation to calculate the marginal amenity value for a set of location-specific 
characteristic. It depends upon comparing similar groups or subsets people who are 
exposed to different wages and housing prices and yet are observed residing in all of 
those metropolitan areas.  Then, quality of life is calculated assuming that those 
individuals are identical.  However, if households sort across metropolitan areas based on 
unobserved ability, then the QOL estimates may be biased since high ability 
individuals reside in high amenity locations and earn more because of ability not because 
of low amenities.  Furthermore, if sorting based on ability leads to a correlation between 
unobserved ability and productivity in each metropolitan area, these unobservable may 
lead to systemic bias. For example, Silicon Valley, located in San Jose, CA, is the home 
to many of the world's largest technology corporations, and it attracts a large number of 
high-talents. Higher wages in San Jose, CA, comes from the higher wage residuals, 
instead of compensating for lower quality life. Many studies find that across metropolitan 
                                                             
1 Here pj denotes the number of worker observations in jurisdiction j, Wij is the wage of ith worker and E(Wij) 
is calculated from wage hedonic equation, reflecting the predicted wage of the same worker based only on 
worker and job traits in community j. 
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areas2, sorting based on worker’s unobserved ability is substantial, that is high-ability 
workers are actually sorted into those attractive places. Glaeser and Maré (2001) find 
those workers who migrate away from large metropolitan areas still remain urban wage 
premium, attributing wage differential across metropolitan areas to the faster 
accumulation of human capital in large cities. Using fixed-effects estimation, Yankow 
(2006) shows that two-thirds of wage advantage for workers in large urban areas can be 
attributed to cities attracting workers of higher unmeasured skills and ability. Combes, 
Duranton and Gobillon (2008) show that individual skill account for 40% to 50% of 
aggregate spatial wage disparities, suggesting strong evidence of spatial sorting by skills. 
The significant ability differentials across locations have a great impact on QOL 
estimation. However, it is impossible to control for all the ability information using 
variables of job and worker characteristics. Therefore, QOL estimates based on the 
traditional hedonic wage regression suffer from sorting on unobserved abilities. For 
example, U. S. census data only include information about education and experience, 
which reflects a small portion of ability. Stover and Leven (1992) derive to solve this 
problem by embedding the wage premium Lj in the housing expenditure hedonics. Their 
rankings of QOL are dramatically different from those in Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn 
(1988) based on the same data, with the spearman rank correlation at 0.004. However, 
this new estimation still relies on imperfect worker and job controls in the underlying 
wage equation. Hence it is extremely difficult to improve the precision of QOL estimates 
without superior controls for workers’ ability information. Given the extremely high cost 
                                                             
2  Fu and Ross (2013) find that agglomeration wage premia within metropolitan areas vanish after 
controlling for commuting costs using confidential data from the 2000 Decennial Census. Further, they 
demonstrate that sorting on ability is even obvious as location controls focus on smaller geographic units. 
 7 
 
of collecting high quality ability data at the individual level, the likelihood of obtaining 
unbiased QOL estimates from wage hedonics seems really low.  
In this study, we are going to simulate an island economy with heterogeneous 
households sorting across locations based on their own innate ability. Each island 
represents a metropolitan area, and has different productivity and amenity level. We 
assume that capital market, labor market, and housing market move to steady states over 
time, and the market prices fully reflect the value of local amenities and factors in other 
markets. With full information of household ability, exogenous amenity and productivity 
level, we can calculate equilibrium housing consumptions, wages, utilities, rents, and 
housing prices based on the path of the expected rents in the context of this model. Then 
we compute QOL estimates using rents and wages from the expenditure function in two 
scenarios: (A) not conditioning on and (B) conditioning on a representative households’ 
ability. 
A similar island economy model has been proposed by Van Nieuwerburgh and 
Weill (2010), wherein  islands are ranked by a unique characteristics productivity. This 
model is used to investigate housing price dispersion in response to an increase in the 
productivity dispersion across US metropolitan areas. They calibrate the growing wage 
dispersion in the economy and generate growing housing price dispersion consistent with 
30-year increase in dispersion of house price across US metropolitan areas. Since islands 
only differ in productivity, the matching process drives all high ability households into 
these high-productivities places, where both productivity and housing prices are higher. 
Therefore, housing prices obtained from their model are always highly lineally correlated 
with wages, with correlation coefficient at round 0.99. Such a high correlation disagrees 
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with that calculated from the real data they cite which is only 0.12604. The unbelievable 
low correlation is probably originated from the fact that the data of wages and housing 
prices are from two different sources.3 A more reliable empirical correlation coefficient 
should be calculated using the same source of wages and housing prices. Here we employ 
1% sample of Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) data4 to find out the 
correlation coefficients between metropolitan level average housing price and average 
wage which is measured as the multiplication of average hourly wage, usual hours 
worked per week and weeks worked last year. As seen is Table 1.1, the correlation 
coefficient (0.81225) in 1990 is still much smaller than that (0.99) generated by the 
model of Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010). In our model the simulated correlation 
coefficient is around 0.85, much closer to the real data. This improvement can be 
explained by the substitution effect between amenity and productivity — people would 
like to sacrifice some level of productivity for sunshine, beach and low crime rate, etc. In 
those high-amenity places, the lower wages they earn and the high rents they pay drive 
the correlation down. 
Another major difference between our model and that of Van Nieuwerburgh and 
Weill (2010) can be found from the housing supply function. In their model, housing 
supply is restricted by total amounts of construction material endowments across islands, 
whereas the constructible land is unlimited. This leads to unrealistic ever growth of 
housing stock as time goes by. To set up an inelastic housing supply in each community, 
                                                             
3Wage data are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Economic Information System during 
1975-2007, whereas house prices are from the 2000 Census with the Freddie Mac Conventional Mortgage 
Home Price Index. 
4 IPUMS consist of United States census records for 413 demographic variables, but it only includes 
decennial data before 2000.  
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we use a Cobb-Douglas production function with physical capital and fixed land on each 
island so that firm construct housing until marginal product of capital equals capital rate 
in the competitive market.  
 
 
Table 1.1: Correlation Coefficients between wages and housing price 
Year Correlation between wages and housing price 
1980 0.55549 
1990 0.81225 
2000 0.82958 
2007 0.73724 
 
 
Our work is the first study that I am aware of in urban economics to simulate a 
dynamic equilibrium where households sort over island with productivity based on their 
own innate ability with a richly specified housing supply function and where islands 
differ in their amenity levels.  We use the steady state, equilibrium allocation of 
households in order to examine the implication of a standard QOL measure which many 
economist (Rosen (1979), Roback (1982), Blomquist, Berger and Hoehn (1988), Beeson 
and Eberts (1989), Stover and Leven (1992), Albouy (2009)) use. We observe that, with 
unobserved heterogeneity, QOL measures perform really poor in our sorting 
equilibrium. Even though the bias can be narrowed by cutting down the variance of 
ability dispersion, the current QOL estimates from wage hedonics are still not reliable 
given the high ability dispersion across metropolitan areas observed in the data. On the 
other hand, we find that, under certain preference assumptions, QOL measures yield 
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perfect estimates for amenities without unobserved heterogeneity. And our simulation 
results show that the bias is relative small when the condition is not satisfied. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces an island model. 
Section 3 calibrates a steady state equilibrium and discusses several QOL estimators. 
Section 4 concludes. 
 
1.2 An Island Model  
 
In this section, we introduce a dynamic equilibrium model of the housing market 
with heterogenous households. Based on this model, we derive two sets of QOL 
estimates and deliver our main results. 
 
1.2.1 Economic Environment 
 
The national economy is closed and contains a measure-one continuum of cities, 
and here we call them “islands”. Islands differ in three attributes: productivity Ai, the 
level of and housing stock H©, and pure amenity Qi, which is a nonproduced public goods 
and has no explicit price. Each island starts with an initial state 0 0( , , )s A Q H≡ . There is 
no productivity shock and we assume amenity is a stable characteristic, then over time 
islands’ state can be represented as ( , , )t ts A Q H≡ . The productivity process 1{ }t tA
∞
=  
follows a first order Markov chain with N states 1 2t t NtA A A< < ⋅⋅ ⋅ < .  
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Households’ Problem 
The economy is populated by a measure-one continuum of infinitely lived and 
fully mobile households, whose abilities differ in [ ],e e e∈  . With a linear production 
function in labor, each period a household supplies e effective units of labor and earn a 
wage e A× . 
In this model, all households are renters and consume two goods: non-housing 
goods © and housing services (h). The household’s problem is defined as:  
       
,
( , ) max ( , , ),tt c hU e s U c h Q=        (1.1) 
Subject to                                      tc Rh eA+ =  
Following Sommer, Sullivan and Verbrugge (2010), non-separable preference 
over the consumption is modeled. Households are risk averse, and have CRRA utility 
function 
1
,
1
x ρ
ρ
−
−
 with 0ρ > ; where x is a composite measure of consumption. The utility 
of the mixture of consumption has Cobb-Douglas form 1c hα α− . We use a two-stage 
aggregator, suggested by Krusell, Ohanian, Ríos-Rull and Violante (2000), to add 
amenity in. Assuming that amenity is more complementary to housing than other types of 
consumption, households’ utility function is defined as follows: 
      
1 1 1
,
( ( ) )( , ) max ,
1
t
t c h
c h QU e s
α η η α ρ
ρ
− − −
=
−
      (1.2) 
Even though households are fully mobile, they can only reside in the same island 
as they work. Hence in each island the total housing consumption cannot exceed housing 
supply, and it satisfies that 
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        ( , ) ( )
e
t t
t t
e
h e s de H s≤∫ .        (1.3) 
Here e  and e  represent lowest ability and highest ability households have in one island 
respectively, and ( , )tth e s  is the housing consumption of households with ability e  in 
island with state ts . 
Since all the households are fully mobile and there is no information cost, 
households will choose an optimal location to work and live maximizing their utility at 
each period. The inter-temporal problem can be simplified to be period by period 
optimization. In the Competitive equilibrium, household with ability e will choose island 
st such that ( ) max ( , ).
t
t
t ts
U e u e s= Households’ indirect utility function can be represented 
as ( , , )t tV e A R with rent
1( , , ( ))t t tR V e A U e
−= .
  
 
Firm’s Production 
On the supply side of the economy, there is a representative construction firm 
building housing and selling them to real estate firms. Since housing price equals the 
expected present value of all future rents after depreciation, the real estate firms, who pay 
for the housing price and earn the rents, break even and we do not take them into account. 
At each period, the construction firm uses physical capital and land to produce 
output, and capital is employed at price tr  from the competitive factor market. The firm’s 
production function is given as: 
       1 , (0,1).HS AK L withξ ξ   ξ−= ∈       (1.4) 
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Where A is productivity level in this island, K is capital used to produce housing and L 
stands for land. We assume that land is fixed in each island, and construction firm needs 
to pay a lump-sum fee L to use it. The firm’s profit maximization problem can be written 
as  
       { }1max * ,
t
t t t t t tK
P A K L r K Lξ ξ− − −       (1.5) 
and the first-order condition is
1 1 1
1 1* *( ) *( )Kt t t t t t t t t t tr P MP P A K L P A L HS
ξ ξ
ξ ξ ξ ξ ξξ ξ
− −
− −= = = . 
At the end of each period, Firm will have some expectations of future prices 
based on all the information available, and then implements construction ( )tt s∆ .  
 
1.2.2 Competitive Equilibrium Calculation 
 
A competitive equilibrium is defined as: 
(1) All the periods are in equilibrium: In each period given the rent Rt (st) that clears the 
housing market, and productivity level At, housing consumption ht (st) solves the 
household’s utility maximization problem in the island they live such that they 
cannot get higher utility elsewhere.  
 (2) Given the capital rate rt, the construction flow ( )tt s∆ solves the construction firm’s 
profit maximization problem of equation (). In the steady state, rents never change and 
expected housing price in the next period equals 11
( )[ ( )] .
1 (1 )
t
t t
t
R sE P s
β δ
+
+ = − −
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Methodology for finding a Single Period Equilibrium 
In this model, islands are ranked by productivity and amenity, which jointly 
affects their attractiveness to households, and households are sorted by ability. In the 
competitive equilibrium, each household seek an island that perfectly matches its ability 
such that all the individuals maximize their utilities. To determine the equilibrium 
assignment of households to islands, we use a method called “shooting” algorithm 
proposed by Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010). This method calculates the ability levels at 
the island boundary given the distribution of housing stocks H1t, H2t,…, HNt, exogenous 
minimum ability level e1t, and initial guess of minimum utility on the first island U1t. 
Specifically, this method is performed via the following steps: 
(1) Starting from the least favorable island, rent R1t can be derived from the indirect 
utility function given ability e1t, productivity A1t, and utility U1t. 
(2) Integrating all the personal housing consumption over ability e until housing stock 
H1t exhausted to find out the maximum ability e2t on the first island, which is also 
the boundary household between the first and the second island. 
(3) For the boundary households, it is indifferent between living in the adjacent two 
islands. The loss of amenity or productivity can be perfectly offset by the decrease 
of rents. Hence, we can derive the utility difference equation as below: 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1( , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , , , )i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i iU e A Q R U e A Q R F U e e A Q R+ + + + + + += =   
And then use this equation to get U2t. 
(4) Having e2t and U2t, we proceed to calculate rent R2t. let us firstly consider a 
simplified condition as studied by Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) in which the 
islands are only ranked by productivity. The assignment of household across the 
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islands can be easily determined since those with relatively lower (higher) levels of 
ability will always locate on lower (higher) ranked islands. In our model, however, 
there are two characteristics for each island so that once the least favorable islands 
are fully populated with lowest-ability households, those with relatively higher 
ability may move to places either with a higher productivity or with a higher 
amenity. Such uncertainty in the preference results in a complicated equilibrium 
assignment of households across islands, which has to be inferred from households’ 
housing bids. It is known that places with higher rents are more pleasant but they 
will always outbid by the ones with higher-ability, which drives them to the lower-
rent place. We can use this logic to decide the ranking of all the islands by 
comparing rents at each boundary, and calculate the equilibrium assignment of 
households and equilibrium rent R2t.5 
(5) Repeating the procedures (2)-(4) to obtain the entire sequence of ability cutoffs 
1 1t Nt N te e e e e+≡ < ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ < < ≡ and utility levels U1t, U2t,…, UNt. 
(6) Comparing housing stock HNt with aggregate housing demand of the last island 
(which is the summation of the personal housing consumption from eNt to e ) to 
check if there exists a housing shortage or surplus. If yes, the initial guess of 
minimum utility U1t will be adjusted by a correction equation according to the linear 
stationary iterative methods. 
 
                                                             
5 In principle, you could imagine a complex set of preference. Since islands are not continuous, each island 
has a certain level of housing stock. Household with continuous ability are filled into each island until the 
housing stock is exhausted. After assigning a boundary individual to the next least desirable jurisdiction 
and then filling this jurisdiction, the individuals who enter the next jurisdiction in principle might have an 
opposite rank of these two jurisdictions. If so, equilibrium would require that these individuals change 
places. We refer to this possibility as a reversal. The matching process is not in equilibrium when reversals 
happen. For our simulations, we verify that reversals of this sort never take place. 
 16 
 
Dynamic Equilibrium 
In the dynamic process, the difficulty in finding a steady state is the following 
simultaneity: 
(1) Without the information of housing price of the next period, firms cannot 
predict future housing demand and make decisions on housing constructions.  
(2) Without the housing stock of each island, the shooting method cannot 
calculate rents, equilibrium assignment of households, and housing price.  
The key to the solution of the first problem is that firm knows what the expected 
rents are in the steady state. We design a strategy for firm to find out what the actual 
prices of the next period would be using iterative process. At the end of each period, an 
initial prediction of the rents and housing prices is made for the following period based 
on the assumption that what is true in the steady state is also true in the off-steady state 
path.  
Firstly, by summing up all individual’s housing consumption across island, 
housing demand in each island equals: 
       ( , , ) ( )
e
t it t t
e
HD h e A R f e de= ∫        (1.6) 
Secondly, under the housing market clearing condition that housing demand 
equals housing supply, current rent can be represented as a function of tHS : 
       1( , , ) ( )
e
t it t t
e
R h e A HS f e de−= ∫        (1.7) 
Thirdly, a forward-looking firm can derive the expected housing price in the next 
period using current rents assuming rents remain the same in the next period, which is 
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true in the steady state. With pre-determined productivity level and housing supply, the 
expectation of next period’s housing price is a function of housing supply in period t+1. 
    
1
1
1
( , , ) ( )
( ( ))( ( )) .
1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
e
it t tt
et t
t
h e A HS f e de
E R sE P s
β δ β δ
−
+
+ = =− − − −
∫
   (1.8) 
Lastly, based on the constant capital rate rt+1, land size Lt+1, and the first-order 
condition 1 1 1*
K
t t tr P MP+ + += , housing supply can be derived by solving the equation below. 
And construction firm’s construction flow equals 1t tHS HS+ − .
 
 
1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
( , , ) ( )
( ) * *( )
1 (1 )
e
it t t
eK
t t t t t t
h e A HS f e de
r E P MP A L HS
ξ ξ
ξ ξ ξα
β δ
−
− −
+ + + + + += = − −
∫
  (1.9) 
As iterations carry on, the expectation of housing price in the next period will be 
modified gradually approaching their true value until the economy converges to steady 
state. In the steady state, the expected rents equal their true value, that is 1 1( ) ,t tE R R+ +=  
and expected housing price, which is used to approximate Pt+1, can be calculated using 
next period’s rents after depreciation as 11
( ( ))( ( ))
1 (1 )
t
t t
t
E R sE P s
β δ
+
+
 
= − − 
6 . 
To solve the second problem, we assume an initial housing stock and implement 
the shooting algorithm, we find that any initial housing stock converge to the only one 
                                                             
6 This only holds in the steady state. In order to know housing price in the next period, we need to know all 
the rents afterwards. Since we do not care about the path to the steady state, we use the simple way in the 
paper. To verify that the simple method is effective, we do the following: (1) use the method above to 
calculate housing constructions and rents based on the initial prediction of E(Pt+1); (2) iterate until steady 
state to get an entire path of rents are obtained; (3) Following Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010), use the 
rents to back up the whole sequence of housing prices, which equals to the expected present value of all 
future rents after depreciation as 
0
( ) (1 ) ( )t j j t j tt t t j
j
P s E R s sβ δ
∞
+
+
=
 
= − 
 
∑ ; (4) use the actual housing price 
repeating step (1)-(3) to get a new housing price; (5) iterate step (4) using the new housing prices calculated 
from (4) many times to ensure accuracy. We have verified that this method reaches the same steady state as 
the simple method. 
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housing steady state after many iterations. In the calibration, we just use an even housing 
stock at the beginning for simplicity. 
 
1.3 Quality of Life Indices 
1.3.1 Calibration and Parameters 
 
The model in Section 2 provides us an economic environment to calculate rents, 
housing price and QOL estimates based on the information of productivity and amenity. 
We calibrate our model so that the steady state productivity distribution matches the key 
moments of wage distribution in 1975 data, and the amenity levels matches the 
correlation between wage and housing prices. In order to choose these three parameters, 
we solve the model repeatedly until the three endogenously generated moments can 
perfectly match their counterparts in the real data. Except these three parameters 
determined in the calibration process, all other parameters are set externally to the 
conventional values. In this section, these parameters, listed in Table 1.2, will be 
described in detail. 
Following Sommer, Sullivan and Verbrugge (2010), households are risk averse 
and have a risk aversion variable ρ = 2 in equation (2). To match the housing expenditure 
to income ratio 0.12 in the 2000 census data, we set the power of non-housing 
consumption α=0.855 and the power of housing consumption in the mixing consumption 
of housing and amenity η=0.8. Households’ ability follow a truncated double-Pareto 
distribution with mean normalized to 1. Since there are only 25 cities in the model, we 
truncate 1% from the tails to avoid the odd performance of households with extreme low 
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or high abilities. We choose the Pareto coefficient ke, which is reversely correlated with 
the cross-sectional standard deviation of ability, equals 17.889 as Van Nieuwerburgh and 
Weill (2010). 
The parameter ξ in the housing production function is inversely related to the 
fraction of land value in the housing construction costs, we set  ξ =0.7 to match the fact 
that land value contribute to about 30% of housing construction costs according to 
Albouy (2012). Housing is depreciated at a rate of 0.016 following Van Nieuwerburgh 
and Weill (2010). We choose the time discount factor β=0.951 and the capital rate rt 
=5.15% to match Primary Mortgage Market 30-year fixed rate mortgage rate between 
1974 and 2013.  
In our model, log productivity follows a normal distribution with mean µ and 
standard deviation σ. Using quadrature-based method from Tauchen and Hussey (1991), 
we obtain five Gaussian quadrature points to approximate the continuous productivity 
distribution. Following Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010), the mean and standard 
deviation of log productivity in the steady states are taken to be 17.78 and 0.084 to match 
the population weighted average real wage per job and cross-sectional coefficient of 
variation (CV) of real wage per job in 1975, respectively.7  
  
                                                             
7 Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) calculate population-weighted moments using nominal wage-per-job 
data and number of jobs for each metropolitan area from Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional Economic 
Information System, and then deflate the nominal wage by a regional cost-of-living index excluding 
housing to get population weighted average real wage per job and CV of real wage per job for 330 US 
metropolitan areas in 1975. 
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Table 1.2: Calibration Parameters in the Model with Cobb-Douglas Utility Function8 
Parameters Descriptions Numbers Matches 
    
Calibration Parameters   
µ mean productivity level 17.78 1975 pw-avg real wage per job 
σ productivity dispersion 0.084 1975 pw-CV real wage per job 
∆ Q amenity difference 1.4 Wage-housing prices correlation9 
    
External parameters   
Households   
ρ risk aversion variable 2 Sommer, Sullivan and Verbrugge (2010) 
β time discount factor 0.951 30-year fixed rate mortgage 
α non-housing consumption weights 0.855 
2000 Census data 
η housing consumption to amenity 0.8 
ke ability dispersion 17.889 Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) 
Production   
δ depreciation rate of housing stock 0.016 Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) 
ξ nonland cost in housing construction 0.7 Albouy (2012) 
rt capital return rate 0.0515 30-year fixed rate mortgage 
 
 
Another calibration parameter, difference between levels of amenities, targets at 
the wage–housing price correlation coefficient. As explained in Section 1, adding 
amenity allows for a much lower correlation due to the substitution effect between wages 
and housing prices. However, one has to admit that people would not live in places with 
extremely low productivity (low wages) but very high amenity (high housing prices). In 
                                                             
8  A different utility is used in Section 3.3. Same external parameters and same targeted productivity 
distribution are applied except the households’ preference parameters, which will be introduced in that 
section.  
9 Here it is set to near the lower limit, not calibrated to the real correlation in IPUMS data. 
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other words, amenity is not a perfect substitute for productivity. As a result, there exists a 
lower limit of the correlation in our model, which is found to be higher than the 
correlation coefficient from IPUMS data (0.81225, see Section 1). In our calibration the 
correlation coefficient is set to be right above the lower limit (0.8627 in the first model 
and 0.8515 in the second model). Such a calibration is not an exact match to the real data, 
but the generated amenity difference in our model is sufficiently close to reflect the effect 
of households’ difference preferences on their spatial allocation and QOL estimations in 
later sections. 
 
1.3.2 QOL Measures with Unobserved Heterogeneity 
 
If hedonic models are poor predictors of wages, then households will differ 
substantially over unobserved ability and sorting over these differences may bias QOL 
measures.  In order to assess these effects, we develop the standard QOL expenditure 
function measure assuming all individual compared are homogeneous even though they 
differ in ability.  
The standard QOL measure can be calculated from the expenditure function as 
Albouy (2008). With the Cobb-Douglas utility function, given island i’s housing price Ri, 
the j’s household on wage wij the net expenditure function can be represented as: 
 
,
1 (1 )(1 )
( )(1 )
1 (1 )(1 ) (1 )
( )(1 )
( , , , ) min{ , ( , , ) }
[(1 ) ] ( ) [ ]
(1 ) (1 )
* ,
i i ij ij i i i ij ij ij i ijc h
i i
ij i i ij
ij i i ij
E Q R u w c R h w U c h Q u
R Ru Q R w
cons u Q R w
α η α
α η αη ρ αη α η αη α η
α η η α
α η αη ρ αη α η αη α η
α αρ
η α η α
− −
+ − − − − − −
− − −
+ − − − − − −
= + − ≥
= − + −
− −
= −
  (1.10) 
 22 
 
Here ,ij ijw u  represents wage and maximum utility of jth households’ on island i, and Ri 
and Qi denote island i’s rents and amenity respectively. Since households are fully mobile, 
their utility must be the same across islands. In equilibrium, no households require 
additional compensation to live in its city, this is: 
        ( , , , ) 0.i i iE Q R u w =         (1.11) 
As such, QOL estimates, capturing the value of a city’s amenity, can be derived as: 
   
1
1 1 (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )( , , ) * ,i i i i iQ E R u w cons R w u
η αη α η
η α η α η ρ
− −
− − − − − − −= =     (1.12) 
where iw stands for the average wage on island i, and u is the utility attained nationally by 
all households. Wages reflect both ability and productivity, and are higher in those 
attractive, high amenity places where high ability households are residing. A higher w
will result in lower QOL estimates according to equation (12) since 0
(1 )(1 )
αη α η
α η
− −
<
− −
. 
 To show these phenomena, we calculate the QOL estimates of twenty-five locations with 
five different levels of actual amenities (Groups 1-5) in the calibrated equilibrium using 
the island model in Section 2. Within each given group, these locations can be further 
divided into five categories (A-E) with different levels of productivity. We choose five 
representative households and calculate their perceived QOL measures using their utility 
levels. The percentile rank of these five households’ ability levels are 10th percentile, 25th 
percentile, median, 75th percentile, 90th percentile respectively. 
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Table 1.3: QOL Estimates with Unobserved Household Heterogeneity 
       
QOL estimates 
Group Island Productivity Amenity Ability Wages Rents 10th pct 25th pct median 75th pct 90th pct 
1 
A 17.4201 1.2000 0.8046 14.0161 1.3413 421.2573 2336.0228 8739.0305 32692.5987 181292.1978 
B 17.5874 1.2000 0.8603 15.1309 1.4530 15.0366 83.3833 311.9358 1166.9477 6471.1438 
C 17.7398 1.2000 0.8866 15.7277 1.5619 4.4217 24.5200 91.7290 343.1571 1902.9294 
D 17.8936 1.2000 0.9196 16.4552 1.6789 1.1009 6.1046 22.8373 85.4340 473.7621 
E 18.0655 1.2000 0.9510 17.1804 1.8188 0.3275 1.8159 6.7933 25.4137 140.9283 
2 
A 17.4201 2.6000 0.9051 15.7677 1.6273 4.3265 23.9921 89.7542 335.7694 1861.9620 
B 17.5874 2.6000 0.9316 16.3844 1.7628 1.4949 8.2898 31.0122 116.0161 643.3508 
C 17.7398 2.6000 0.9589 17.0111 1.8949 0.5301 2.9397 10.9974 41.1412 228.1426 
D 17.8936 2.6000 0.9791 17.5199 2.0369 0.2563 1.4214 5.3174 19.8922 110.3092 
E 18.0655 2.6000 1.0004 18.0735 2.2066 0.1229 0.6816 2.5498 9.5389 52.8967 
3 
A 17.4201 4.0000 0.9420 16.4101 1.8123 1.5408 8.5444 31.9644 119.5785 663.1056 
B 17.5874 4.0000 0.9729 17.1116 1.9633 0.4900 2.7171 10.1647 38.0262 210.8688 
C 17.7398 4.0000 0.9903 17.5684 2.1104 0.2652 1.4704 5.5008 20.5783 114.1138 
D 17.8936 4.0000 1.0126 18.1187 2.2685 0.1294 0.7174 2.6838 10.0400 55.6755 
E 18.0655 4.0000 1.0538 19.0379 2.4575 0.0390 0.2163 0.8092 3.0273 16.7873 
4 
A 17.4201 5.4000 0.9662 16.8320 1.9535 0.8459 4.6911 17.5492 65.6513 364.0601 
B 17.5874 5.4000 0.9953 17.5056 2.1163 0.3004 1.6658 6.2319 23.3134 129.2811 
C 17.7398 5.4000 1.0199 18.0923 2.2748 0.1392 0.7718 2.8872 10.8009 59.8948 
D 17.8936 5.4000 1.0398 18.6052 2.4453 0.0783 0.4344 1.6252 6.0797 33.7141 
E 18.0655 5.4000 1.1055 19.9722 2.6490 0.0153 0.0848 0.3173 1.1871 6.5831 
5 
A 17.4201 6.8000 0.9849 17.1576 2.0694 0.5456 3.0257 11.3190 42.3441 234.8131 
B 17.5874 6.8000 1.0061 17.6952 2.2418 0.2688 1.4904 5.5754 20.8575 115.6624 
C 17.7398 6.8000 1.0287 18.2483 2.4098 0.1360 0.7544 2.8221 10.5573 58.5441 
D 17.8936 6.8000 1.0735 19.2087 2.5903 0.0402 0.2227 0.8331 3.1167 17.2833 
E 18.0655 6.8000 1.1782 21.2842 2.8061 0.0056 0.0313 0.1170 0.4378 2.4275 
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As listed in table 1.3, within each group QOL estimates falls as productivity 
increases from Island A to Island E. For locations with the same productivity in different 
groups (e.g. 1A, 2A, …, 5A), their QOL estimates decreases as the actual amenity level 
goes up from group 1 to group 5. We refer to this as reversals. In column 5, it is clearly 
shown that the increases in amenity or in productivity are actually accompanied by 
increasing households’ abilities, and he increasing ability contributes to the increase in 
wages. However, in Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), this effect has been ignored 
because they assume that all the households are identical. 
To investigate the effect of increasing ability on wages, we decompose the 
changes in wages into two parts: changes in abilities and changes in productivities. By 
conditioning on the productivity level at 17.7533 and holding everything else constant, 
we compute the following statistic: 
      
2
3 3[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
Var w A A A Var e
Var w Var w
µ
= ×
= =       (1.13) 
We find that 81.48% of the wage differentials across metropolitan areas are due to ability 
changes. Then we check the changes in QOL estimates as the variance of ability 
decreases. From Table 4, at a very high value of μ (μ=81.43%), the reversals always exist. 
As μ decreases to smaller values, the reversals start to disappear firstly at the places with 
high productivity (see e.g., the column of QOL at μ =65.03%). At a very low value of μ 
(μ = 33.51%), the reversals completely vanish.  
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Table 1.4: QOL Estimates with Unobserved Household Heterogeneity for different μ  
    
QOL estimates 
Group Island Productivity amenity μ=81.43% μ=65.03% μ=61.62% μ=55.80% μ=42.02% μ=33.51% μ=11.05% 
1 
A 17.4201 1.2000 8739.0305 22.3569 16.8762 11.3836 5.7963 4.2302 2.1060 
B 17.5874 1.2000 311.9358 8.0150 6.6974 5.2029 3.3650 2.7424 1.7382 
C 17.7398 1.2000 91.7290 5.3394 4.6388 3.8057 2.7030 2.3014 1.6073 
D 17.8936 1.2000 22.8373 3.3435 3.0371 2.6525 2.0981 1.8788 1.4678 
E 18.0655 1.2000 6.7933 2.2165 2.0935 1.9313 1.6790 1.5715 1.3549 
2 
A 17.4201 2.6000 89.7542 8.8575 7.8936 6.7115 5.0689 4.4417 3.3069 
B 17.5874 2.6000 31.0122 6.1844 5.7027 5.0867 4.1725 3.8004 3.0838 
C 17.7398 2.6000 10.9974 4.3495 4.1468 3.8764 3.4474 3.2614 2.8795 
D 17.8936 2.6000 5.3174 3.3968 3.3152 3.2027 3.0146 2.9289 2.7440 
E 18.0655 2.6000 2.5498 2.6448 2.6431 2.6398 2.6317 2.6267 2.6133 
3 
A 17.4201 4.0000 31.9644 8.3059 7.7583 7.0466 5.9633 5.5117 4.6205 
B 17.5874 4.0000 10.1647 5.6268 5.4533 5.2167 4.8276 4.6532 4.2829 
C 17.7398 4.0000 5.5008 4.5652 4.5130 4.4389 4.3098 4.2487 4.1118 
D 17.8936 4.0000 2.6838 3.6062 3.6465 3.7022 3.7953 3.8377 3.9291 
E 18.0655 4.0000 0.8092 2.4653 2.5872 2.7664 3.0976 3.2631 3.6557 
4 
A 17.4201 5.4000 17.5492 8.2592 7.9415 7.5127 6.8201 6.5147 5.8770 
B 17.5874 5.4000 6.2319 5.8058 5.7718 5.7224 5.6326 5.5886 5.4866 
C 17.7398 5.4000 2.8872 4.5304 4.6134 4.7299 4.9305 5.0244 5.2324 
D 17.8936 5.4000 1.6252 3.7755 3.9137 4.1135 4.4732 4.6486 5.0547 
E 18.0655 5.4000 0.3173 2.2455 2.4487 2.7623 3.3885 3.7240 4.5799 
5 
A 17.4201 6.8000 11.3190 8.2824 8.1374 7.9348 7.5899 7.4300 7.0793 
B 17.5874 6.8000 5.5754 6.5327 6.5648 6.6076 6.6747 6.7033 6.7604 
C 17.7398 6.8000 2.8221 5.2646 5.4033 5.6007 5.9481 6.1139 6.4894 
D 17.8936 6.8000 0.8331 3.5735 3.8089 4.1620 4.8358 5.1824 6.0295 
E 18.0655 6.8000 0.1170 1.9079 2.1618 2.5725 3.4568 3.9634 5.3514 
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According to Combes, Duranton and Gobillon (2008)10 and  Yankow (2006)11, an 
acceptable value of μ  should be within the range of 40%–67%. As seen in Figure 1.1, 
QOL estimates between μ =65.03% and μ =42.02% are strongly biased, suggesting that 
QOL indices obtained by most of existing empirical studies based on Rosen (1979) and 
Roback (1982) model are not reliable. 
 
Figure 1.1: QOL Estimates with Different μ 
 
 
 
1.3.3 QOL measures without unobserved heterogeneity 
 
In a pure sorting model, without unobserved heterogeneity, you cannot always 
observe the same type in all places.  As a result, the person type who is only in one place 
                                                             
10 Combes, Duranton and Gobillon (2008) shows that 40-50% of existing spatial wage disparity are from 
the differences in skills. 
11 Yankow (2006)  argues that two-thirds of workers’ wage premium in large urban areas are due to higher 
unmeasured skills and ability. 
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likely prefers that place over all others.  However, QOL measures are based on 
indifference.  Under certain preference assumptions, even if unique individuals in your 
model are in only one island, QOL measures still accurate capture amenity level.      
 
Proposition: For households with different abilities e1, e2, …, eN,  QOL estimates from 
indirect utility yield consistent estimates, specially 
For any island m, ( , , ), ;m m m m i i iQ Q R w u e e= ∀               
only if it satisfies the following condition: 
1 1 1( , , ) ( ( , ), , ) ( , , ( , ))i i i i i iV w u R V g A e u R V e u f A R
− − −= = . 
 
We can show this proposition roughly with proof by contradiction: 
In the case that 1 2Q Q= . Suppose 1 2Q Q≠  , then 
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
( , , ( , )) ( , , ( , ));
( , ) ( , )
V e u f A R V e u f A R
f A R f A R
− −≠
≠
 
We use the same representative households’ ability and utility in these two places, and 
derive the expenditure functions as below: 
1 1 1 2 2 2( , , ) ; ( , , ) .E R u Q eA E R u Q eA= =  
By rearranging these two equations, we can get 
1 1 1 2 2 2( , ) ( ); ( , ) ( ).q A R q Q q A R q Q= =  
Since 1 2Q Q= , we have 1 2( ) ( )q Q q Q= .  
Then 1 1 2 2( , ) ( , )q A R q A R= , which is contradictory with the condition 1 1 1 1( , ) ( , )f A R f A R≠ .  
And the same proof also applies the case when 1 2Q Q≠ .  
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One example satisfying the condition above is the economy of heterogenous 
households with a Cobb-Douglas utility function. QOL indices are calculated following 
the same procedure in Section 3.1.  Based on the indifference, we choose a representative 
household who lives in all the islands and calculate QOL he/she actually enjoys. Without 
unobserved heterogeneity, QOL estimates are presented as below:  
  
1
1 1 (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 ) (1 )(1 )(1 )( , , , ) * ,i i i i iQ E R u e A cons R A e u
η αη α η αη α η
η α η α η α η ρ
− − − −
− − − − − − − − −= =   (1.14) 
here e and u  denote the representative households’ ability and utility level; Ai and Ri 
represent island i’ productivity and rents.  
We calibrate an island economy with 25 cities to match the key moments of wage 
distribution in 1975 and apply this measure to the equilibrium data. We find that QOL 
indices yield near perfect estimates after controlling for ability. The reason behind this is 
straightforward. Because of the special form of indirect utility, a constant relationship 
( , )i if A R  between rent and productivity always holds. When we change e andu , all the 
islands are exposed to the same marginal effect on ( , )i if A R . Therefore, QOL can be 
perfectly estimated as a monotonic transformation of actual amenity. Intuitively, in each 
island, housing are priced to reflect all the changes in productivity, that is, the amount of 
rise in rent exactly cancels out the effects of the increase in productivity. The results are 
listed in Table 1.5, same QOL estimates are obtained with all five different representative 
households. 
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Table 1.5: QOL Estimates without Unobserved Household Heterogeneity 
Group Island Productivity Amenity Ability Wages Rents QOL estimates 
1 
A 17.4201 1.2000 0.8046 14.0161 1.3413 1.2000 
B 17.5874 1.2000 0.8603 15.1309 1.4530 1.2000 
C 17.7398 1.2000 0.8866 15.7277 1.5619 1.2000 
D 17.8936 1.2000 0.9196 16.4552 1.6789 1.2000 
E 18.0655 1.2000 0.9510 17.1804 1.8188 1.2000 
2 
A 17.4201 2.6000 0.9051 15.7677 1.6273 2.6000 
B 17.5874 2.6000 0.9316 16.3844 1.7628 2.6000 
C 17.7398 2.6000 0.9589 17.0111 1.8949 2.6000 
D 17.8936 2.6000 0.9791 17.5199 2.0369 2.6000 
E 18.0655 2.6000 1.0004 18.0735 2.2066 2.6000 
3 
A 17.4201 4.0000 0.9420 16.4101 1.8123 4.0000 
B 17.5874 4.0000 0.9729 17.1116 1.9633 4.0000 
C 17.7398 4.0000 0.9903 17.5684 2.1104 4.0000 
D 17.8936 4.0000 1.0126 18.1187 2.2685 4.0000 
E 18.0655 4.0000 1.0538 19.0379 2.4575 4.0000 
4 
A 17.4201 5.4000 0.9662 16.8320 1.9535 5.4000 
B 17.5874 5.4000 0.9953 17.5056 2.1163 5.4000 
C 17.7398 5.4000 1.0199 18.0923 2.2748 5.4000 
D 17.8936 5.4000 1.0398 18.6052 2.4453 5.4000 
E 18.0655 5.4000 1.1055 19.9722 2.6490 5.4000 
5 
A 17.4201 6.8000 0.9849 17.1576 2.0694 6.8000 
B 17.5874 6.8000 1.0061 17.6952 2.2418 6.8000 
C 17.7398 6.8000 1.0287 18.2483 2.4098 6.8000 
D 17.8936 6.8000 1.0735 19.2087 2.5903 6.8000 
E 18.0655 6.8000 1.1782 21.2842 2.8061 6.8000 
 
When the condition 1 1 1( , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , ( , ))i i i i iV w u R V e u A R V e u f A R
− − −= =  does 
not hold, QOL estimates will be biased. In order to investigate how the bias arises, let 
us take a new utility function violating the condition. Following Van Nieuwerburgh and 
Weill (2010), we use a utility function that is separable in non-durable consumption and 
housing services and add amenity as an additional term for simplicity. The flow utility for 
non-durable consumption is linear, while the flow utility over housing consumption is 
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strictly increasing, strictly concave, bounded-above, unbounded below and twice-
continuously differentiable.  
    1
0
( , ) max{ / (1 ) ( ) } ,t tt t thu e s eA h R s h Q
γκ γ−
≥
= + − − +     (1.15) 
We assume there are three cities (1, 2, 3) in the economy and they all have the 
same amenity level Q but different productivity levels A1<A2<A3. The lower bounds of 
households’ ability in each city are e1<e2< e3. The indirect utility function is: 
     
1 1
( , , , ) ,
1i i i i i
U e A R Q eA R Q
γ
γ γγ κ
γ
−
= + +
−
      (1.16) 
Using indirect utility function, QOL estimates in each city can be easily derived as: 
        
1
,i iQ u eA R
γ
γβ
−
= − −           (1.17) 
where 
1
1
γγβ κ
γ
=
−
. For a household with ability e2, its perceived QOL estimates in cities 
1, 2, and 3 are: 
        
1
1 2 2 1 1Q u e A R
γ
γβ
−
= − − ,       (1.18) 
        
1
2 2 2 2 2Q u e A R
γ
γβ
−
= − − ,       (1.19) 
and       
1
3 2 2 3 3Q u e A R
γ
γβ
−
= − − ,       (1.20)  
respectively. In equilibrium, this boundary household receives the same utility ( 2u ) in 
both cities, i.e., 
     
1
2 2 1 1 1 2 1 1( , , , ) ,u U e A R Q e A R Q
γ
γβ
−
= = + +      (1.21) 
     
1
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2( , , , )u U e A R Q e A R Q
γ
γβ
−
= = + +       (1.22) 
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Similarly, for household with ability 3e  we have  
        
1
3 3 2 2u e A R Q
γ
γβ
−
= + + ,       (1.23) 
        
1
3 3 3 3u e A R Q
γ
γβ
−
= + + .       (1.24) 
Substituting (21) and (22) into (18) and (19), respectively, we can conclude that 
1 2Q Q Q= =  . 
Combining (20) and (24), we get: 
       3 2 2 3 3 3 3
2 3 2 3 3
( )
( ) ( )
Q u e A u e A Q
Q u u e e A
= − − − −
= + − − −

      (1.25) 
Using equation (22) and (23) in (25), QOL estimate in city 3 is:   
  
1 1
3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3
2 3 2 2 3 3
2 3 2 3
(( ) ( )) ( )
( ) ( )
( )( )
Q Q e A R Q e A R Q e e A
Q e e A e e A
Q e e A A
γ γ
γ γβ β
− −
= + + + − + + − −
= + − − −
= + − −

.  (1.26) 
Since A1<A2<A3 and e1<e2<e3, 2 3 2 3( )( ) 0e e A A− − > and hence 3Q Q> , i.e., Q3 is 
overestimated. 
As illustrated above, QOL measures are unbiased in the islands where the 
representative households are residing (cities 1 and 2), but are biased in the islands where 
they do not live (city 3). This result can be understood in the way that for two adjacent 
islands with same amenity but different productivity levels, QOL holds constant only if 
rent rises by exactly the amount necessary to cancel out the effects of the increase in 
productivity. Only the boundary household is indifferent between islands, and this 
representative household cannot be the boundary person everywhere, As such, QOL 
estimates are biased in the islands where the representative household does not locate. 
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Specifically, in the example above, the household with the lowest ability (e2) in the 
second island clearly values the increase in productivity from the second to the third 
communities less than the boundary individual e3, and the increase in rent that makes the 
e3 indifferent should leave the e2 worse off. Hence QOL estimates must be overestimated 
in the third community to keep this person’s utility the same across islands. As a result, 
even if all individual ability factors affecting wages are obtained, QOL estimates would 
still be biased because of the fact that the hypothetical constant quality individual 
obtained by the wage residual approach cannot be the boundary individual in all the 
locations being compared.  
To confirm the analysis above, we listed in Table 1.6 the simulated QOL 
estimates of 25 islands for the representative household with ability e2 as well as for 
households with abilities ranked at 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentiles. Our results 
are consistent with the conclusions above that QOL estimates of the representative 
household are unbiased for the first two islands, and are overestimated for the third and 
the rest ones. For all the households we investigate, their QOL estimates are unbiased in 
their respective residing islands (bolded values), and are generally biased in other islands. 
Generally, across islands with the same amenity level, QOL of a given investigated 
household drops with an increasing productivity level if this household owns a higher 
ability than those residing in these islands. On the other hand, if this household owns a 
lower ability, then the relation between QOL estimates and productivity level is reversed. 
However, the estimation errors in QOL measures are relatively small even though the 
preference assumptions do not satisfy.  
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Table 1.6: QOL Estimates without Unobserved Household Heterogeneity 
       QOL estimates 
rank Productivity QOL Ablity Wages Rent people e_2 e_10th e_25th e_median e_75th e_90th 
1 17.12929 2.43536 0.778742 13.33929 1.341709 0.004437 2.43536 2.499925 2.532932 2.558843 2.591039 2.649439 
2 17.39076 2.43536 0.804145 13.9847 1.4583 0.005922 2.43536 2.461067 2.478322 2.491539 2.510533 2.550995 
3 17.63028 2.43536 0.824851 14.54235 1.572575 0.007525 2.442148 2.432259 2.435085 2.436674 2.443573 2.467603 
4 17.8731 2.43536 0.843388 15.07396 1.695666 0.010378 2.454818 2.408842 2.397041 2.386842 2.381478 2.388851 
7 18.14592 2.43536 0.88286 16.02031 1.856534 0.014782 2.502261 2.41574 2.387503 2.36406 2.344919 2.333575 
5 17.12929 3.21768 0.858371 14.70329 1.687515 0.008975 3.181311 3.245876 3.278883 3.304794 3.336991 3.395391 
6 17.39076 3.21768 0.870497 15.13861 1.829958 0.011893 3.204827 3.230533 3.247789 3.261006 3.279999 3.320462 
8 17.63028 3.21768 0.894039 15.76215 1.963272 0.014877 3.222142 3.212253 3.215079 3.216668 3.223566 3.247597 
10 17.8731 3.21768 0.913583 16.32855 2.116337 0.020495 3.263656 3.21768 3.205879 3.19568 3.190316 3.197689 
12 18.14592 3.21768 0.93225 16.91653 2.298037 0.028463 3.315313 3.228792 3.200555 3.177112 3.157971 3.146627 
9 17.12929 4 0.903892 15.48302 2.078459 0.017017 3.937439 4.002004 4.035011 4.060921 4.093118 4.151518 
11 17.39076 4 0.922921 16.0503 2.241146 0.022164 3.969669 3.995375 4.012631 4.025848 4.044841 4.085304 
13 17.63028 4 0.941141 16.59258 2.398324 0.02751 4.003936 3.994046 3.996873 3.998462 4.00536 4.029391 
15 17.8731 4 0.957073 17.10586 2.574655 0.037421 4.057777 4.011801 4 3.989801 3.984438 3.99181 
17 18.14592 4 0.973179 17.65923 2.783135 0.051255 4.122876 4.036355 4.008118 3.984674 3.965534 3.95419 
14 17.12929 4.78232 0.949039 16.25636 2.508047 0.030303 4.690136 4.754701 4.787708 4.813619 4.845815 4.904215 
16 17.39076 4.78232 0.965037 16.78272 2.696001 0.039094 4.73779 4.763497 4.780753 4.79397 4.812963 4.853425 
18 17.63028 4.78232 0.981091 17.2969 2.876568 0.048085 4.785245 4.775356 4.778182 4.779771 4.78667 4.8107 
20 17.8731 4.78232 0.995299 17.78908 3.076799 0.064679 4.850296 4.80432 4.792519 4.78232 4.776956 4.784329 
22 18.14592 4.78232 1.014298 18.40537 3.313771 0.087599 4.929156 4.842635 4.814398 4.790955 4.771814 4.76047 
19 17.12929 5.56464 0.988065 16.92485 2.980358 0.051479 5.446516 5.511081 5.544088 5.569999 5.602196 5.660596 
21 17.39076 5.56464 1.003316 17.44842 3.193775 0.065781 5.50728 5.532987 5.550243 5.56346 5.582453 5.622915 
23 17.63028 5.56464 1.029202 18.14511 3.395941 0.080057 5.563216 5.553326 5.556153 5.557742 5.56464 5.588671 
24 17.8731 5.56464 1.053767 18.83407 3.620185 0.106582 5.637993 5.592017 5.580216 5.570017 5.564654 5.572026 
25 18.14592 5.56464 1.12711 20.45244 3.889107 0.143228 5.733326 5.646805 5.618568 5.595125 5.575984 5.56464 
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1.4 Conclusion 
 
Our paper provides a general equilibrium framework for analyzing the QOL 
estimates with households’ heterogeneity. Our model relaxes the assumption of identical 
agents in Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) model, households, sorted by ability, choose 
the optimal places to live, and housing prices equilibrate wage differences in a dynamic 
setting. Using the steady state, equilibrium allocation of households to examine the 
implication of a standard QOL measure, we find that with unobserved heterogeneity, the 
standard QOL estimates perform badly. Furthermore, if the functional form of 
productivity and rent can be separated from the indirect utility function, e. g. Cobb-
Douglas utility function, QOL measures yield perfect estimates without unobserved 
heterogeneity. Using an indirect utility function that cannot be separated, we still get 
good QOL estimates in the simulation. 
our results imply that in the empirical study,  QOL estimations using hedonic 
wage and housing expenditure equation based on traditional Rosen (1979) and Roback 
(1982) model are effective if the households’ different ability can be fully controlled for. 
However, if 33%–55% of wage differences across metropolitan areas are due to ability 
differentials as suggested in the agglomeration literature, the bias could be very large.  
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Chapter 2 
Do the Bidding-up Rents in High Amenity Places Lead to 
Housing Boom? 
Abstract:  
Amenities are key fundamentals that have often been ignored in the explanations of the 
rising housing price and price-to-rent ratios. Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (2006) suggest 
that inelastic supply of land in “superstar cities” –high amenity places– and a continuing 
increasing number of high-income households are two driving forces of the increasing 
price dispersion and rent-price ratios across locations. Extending our steady state 
equilibrium model in the first chapter to a dynamic general equilibrium model using 
iterative process, we investigate the effect of amenities difference on regional income, 
housing prices, and price-to-rent ratio over time in response to an income shock. 
Although households’ marginal utility from increases in amenity levels goes up as 
productivity rises, the increasing returns to productivity with ability make amenities less 
important in the bidding process. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Since the late 1990s, the U.S. housing market had experienced a dramatic boom 
followed by a collapse in late 2006. In early 2005, real home prices peaked at 71% above 
its level in the last quarter of 1997 according to Case-Shiller home price index. However, 
the largest price drop in history was reported by the same index on December 30, 2008. 
Moreover, real rent was quite stable during this period. 
From the Asset-Pricing Model, the price of a house should be equal to the 
discounted expected value of all future rents. So real rents and real home prices should 
track each other, and the house price-to-rent ratio is widely used as an indicator of over 
and undervaluation in the housing market. However, during the recent housing boom, the 
real rents remained virtually unchanged, resulting in approximately a forty percent 
increase in house price-to-rent ratio from 2000 to 2006. 
Many papers have examined whether housing booms might be driven by bubbles. 
Stiglitz (1990), Scheinkman and Xiong (2003), Burnside, Eichenbaum and Rebelo (2011), 
and Case and Shiller (2003) find theoretical or empirical evidence of housing market 
bubbles. Ferreira and Gyourko (2011), Glaeser and Gyourko (2006), Sommer, Sullivan 
and Verbrugge (2010), Ortalo-Magné and Rady (2006), Favilukis, Ludvigson and 
Nieuwerburgh (2010), and Aruoba, Davis and Wright (2012) propose that market 
fundamentals are the key determinants of the increasing price-to-rent ratios. These 
fundamentals include low real interest rates, higher local incomes, inflation, relaxation of 
credit constraints, financial market liberalization and the rise in foreign ownership of U.S. 
debt. Zhu, Wright and He (2012) argue that since housing is used as collateral and bears a 
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liquidity premium, house prices display a variety of dynamic equilibrium paths, like 
bubbles, even when fundamentals are constant and agents are fully rational. Bayer, 
Ellickson and Ellickson (2010) study dynamic asset pricing in a system of local housing 
markets, and they related the risk premium of a housing asset to its exposure to risk using 
finance theory. 
It is an open question whether fundamentals can explain housing prices or not. 
Amenities are key fundamentals that have often been ignored in the literature above. 
Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (2013) study the effect of amenities on cross-sectional house 
price dispersion and price-to-rent ratios. They propose that inelastic supply of land in 
high amenity places, labeling these places as “superstar cities”, and an increasing number 
of high-income households are two driving forces of the increasing price dispersion and 
price-to-rent ratios across locations. Continued growth in the number of high-income 
families generates increased demand for “superstar cities”, and scarce land in these 
“superstar cities” leads to a bidding-up of rents, which further sort high-income families 
relatively more into those desirable, unique places. Expectation of increasing rents in 
“Superstar cities” could reasonably explain at least part of the increase in price-to-rent 
ratios and possibly the declines in the U.S. housing market, as well, if the financial crisis 
represented permanent negative shocks to income. 
Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982) study the effect of amenity on wages and 
housing prices in the steady state. In their model, high amenities, which are attractive and 
limited in supply, increase housing price and decreases wages since workers are willing 
to enjoy better quality of life even with lower wages. As another attractive attribute, high 
productivities increase housing prices and wages due to the fact that firms make large 
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profits in these places. In the equilibrium, wages and housing prices adjust such that 
worker feel equally happy across places. 
The explanation of “superstar cities” phenomenon requires a model where people 
sort and housing price equilibrate wage difference in a dynamic setting where average 
wages are growing over time. In this study, we extend our model in the first chapter to a 
dynamic process so that we can investigate the effect of amenities difference on the 
evolution of regional income, housing prices, and housing consumption and price-to-rent 
ratio in response to an income shock. We found that even though households’ marginal 
utility from increases in amenity levels goes up as productivity rises, price differential 
between low amenity places and high amenity places are actually falling. The reason lies 
into the fact that the increasing returns to productivity with ability make amenities less 
important in the bidding process. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces an island model. 
Section 3 explains the calibration process and all the parameters. Section 4 presents all 
the quantitatively results and our findings.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.2 Model Specification  
 
In this section, we build a dynamic general equilibrium model based on Van 
Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) with heterogenous households sorting across the 
different housing markets.  
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2.2.1 Economic Environment 
 
The national economy is closed and contains a measure-one continuum of cities, 
and here we call them “islands”. Islands differ in three attributes: productivity Ait, the 
level of and housing stock Hit, and pure amenity Qi, which is a nonproduced public goods 
and has no explicit price. Each island starts with an initial state 0 0 0( , , )s A Q H≡ . There is 
no productivity shock and we assume amenity is a stable characteristic, then over time 
islands’ state can be represented as ( , , )t t ts A Q H≡ . The productivity process 1{ }t tA
∞
=  
follows a first order Markov chain with N states 1 2t t NtA A A< < ⋅⋅ ⋅ <  with transition 
function ( , )tQ A  ⋅ . Productivity process is persistent such as ( , )tQ A′  ⋅  first-order 
stochastically dominates ( , )tQ A  ⋅ if A A′ > .  
 
Households’ Problem 
The economy is populated by a measure-one continuum of infinitely lived and 
fully mobile households, whose abilities differ in [ ],e e e∈  . With a linear production 
function in labor, each period a household inelastically supplies e effective units of labor 
and earn a wage e A× . 
In this model, all households are renters and consume two goods: non-housing 
goods (c) and housing services (h). The household’s problem is defined as:  
        
,
( , ) max ( , , ),tt c hU e s U c h Q=       (2.1) 
Subject to                                      tc Rh eA+ =  
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Following Sommer, Sullivan and Verbrugge (2010), non-separable preference 
over the consumption is used, and the utility of the mixture of consumption has Cobb-
Douglas form 1c hα α− . Assuming that the constant elasticity of substitution between 
amenity and private consumption, households’ utility function is defined as follows: 
      
1
1
,
( , , ) max ( ) ,
c h
U c h Q c h Qα α β β β− = +        (2.2) 
Even though households are fully mobile, they can only reside in the same island 
as they work. Hence in each island the total housing consumption cannot exceed housing 
supply, and it satisfies that 
        ( , ) ( )
e
t t
t t
e
h e s de H s≤∫         (2.3) 
Here e  and e  represent lowest ability and highest ability households have in one island 
respectively, and ( , )tth e s  is the housing consumption of households with ability e  in 
island with state ts . 
Since all the households are fully mobile and there is no information cost, 
households will choose an optimal location to work and live maximizing their utility at 
each period. The inter-temporal problem can be simplified to be period by period 
optimization. In the Competitive equilibrium, household with ability e will choose island 
st such that ( ) max ( , ).
t
t
t ts
U e u e s= Households’ indirect utility function can be represented 
as ( , , )t tV e A R with rent
1( , , ( ))t t tR V e A U e
−= .
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Firm’s Production 
On the supply side of the economy, there is a representative construction firm 
building housing and selling them to real estate firms. Since housing price equals the 
expected present value of all future rents after depreciation, the real estate firms, who pay 
for the housing price and earn the rents, break even and are not taken into account. 
At each period, the construction firm uses physical capital and land to produce 
output, and capital is employed at price tr  from the competitive factor market. The firm’s 
production function is given as: 
       1 , (0,1).HS AK L withξ ξ   ξ−= ∈       (2.4) 
Where A is productivity level in this island, K is capital used to produce housing and L 
stands for land. We assume that land is fixed in each island, and construction firm needs 
to pay a lump-sum fee L to use it. The firm’s profit maximization problem can be written 
as  
       { }1max * ,
t
t t t t t tK
P A K L r K Lξ ξ− − −       (2.5) 
and the first-order condition is
1 1 1
1 1* *( ) *( )Kt t t t t t t t t t tr P MP P A K L P A L HS
ξ ξ
ξ ξ ξ ξ ξξ ξ
− −
− −= = = . 
There exists a construction limit of the numbers of houses that can be built on one unit of 
land. When this limit is reached, this island cannot build houses anymore. 
At the beginning of each period, Firm implements construction ( )tt s∆  based on 
their expectations of housing prices. Assuming housing stock can be adjusted at no cost 
by dismantling excess housing to recover capital, firm will build until their marginal 
revenue equals capital rate in the competitive market. 
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2.2.2 Competitive Equilibrium Calculation 
 
A competitive equilibrium is defined as: 
(A) All the periods are in equilibrium: In each period given the rent Rt (st) that clears the 
housing market ( ( , ) ( )
e
t t
t t
e
h e s de H s=∫ ), and productivity level At, housing consumption 
ht (st) solves the household’s utility maximization problem of equation (1) in the island 
they live such that they cannot get higher utility elsewhere.  
(B) Housing price equals the expected present value of rents net of depreciation 
0
( ) (1 ) ( )t j j t j tt t t j
j
P s E R s sβ δ
∞
+
+
=
 
= − 
 
∑  
Given the capital rate rt and housing price Pt (st), the construction flow ( )tt s∆ solves the 
construction firm’s profit maximization problem of equation (5). 
 
Methodology for finding a Single Period Equilibrium 
In this model, islands are ranked by productivity and amenity, which jointly 
affects their attractiveness to households, and households are sorted by ability. In the 
competitive equilibrium, each household seek an island that perfectly matches its ability 
such that all the individuals maximize their utilities. To determine the equilibrium 
assignment of households to islands, we use a method called “shooting” algorithm 
proposed by Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010). This method calculates the ability levels at 
the island boundary given the distribution of housing stocks H1t, H2t,…, HNt, exogenous 
minimum ability level e1t, and initial guess of minimum utility on the first island U1t. 
Specifically, this method is performed via the following steps: 
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(1) Starting from the least favorable island, rent R1t can be derived from the indirect 
utility function given ability e1t, productivity A1t, and utility U1t. 
(2) Integrating all the personal housing consumption over ability e until housing stock 
H1t exhausted to find out the maximum ability e2t on the first island, which is also 
the boundary household between the first and the second island. 
(3) For the boundary households, it is indifferent between living in the adjacent two 
islands. The loss of amenity or productivity can be perfectly offset by the decrease 
of rents. Hence, we can derive the utility difference equation as below: 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1( , , , ) ( , , , ) ( , , , , , )i i i i i i i i i i i i i i i iU e A Q R U e A Q R F U e e A Q R+ + + + + + += =   
         And then use this equation to get U2t. 
(4)   Having e2t and U2t, we proceed to calculate rent R2t. let us firstly consider a 
simplified condition as studied by Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) in which the 
islands are only ranked by productivity. The assignment of household across the 
islands can be easily determined since those with relatively lower (higher) levels 
of ability will always locate on lower (higher) ranked islands. In our model, 
however, there are two characteristics for each island so that once the least 
favorable islands are fully populated with lowest-ability households, those with 
relatively higher ability may move to places either with a higher productivity or 
with a higher amenity. Such uncertainty in the preference results in a complicated 
equilibrium assignment of households across islands, which has to be inferred 
from households’ housing bids. It is known that places with higher rents are more 
pleasant but they will always outbid by the ones with higher-ability, which drives 
them to the lower-rent place. Therefore, a boundary person calculates equilibrium 
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rent R2t of the next island either with higher amenity or with higher productivity 
according to rents he paid in the last island and chooses to live in the one with 
lower rent. By this logic, the ranking of all the islands can be determined.12 
(5) Repeating the procedures (2)-(4) to obtain the entire sequence of ability cutoffs 
1 1t Nt N te e e e e+≡ < ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ < < ≡ and utility levels U1t, U2t,…, UNt. 
(6) Comparing housing stock HNt with aggregate housing demand of the last island 
(which is the summation of the personal housing consumption from eNt to e ) to 
check if there exists a housing shortage or surplus. If yes, the initial guess of 
minimum utility U1t will be adjusted by a correction equation according to the 
linear stationary iterative methods. 
 
Figure 2.1: Assortative Matching 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                             
12 In principle, you could imagine a complex set of preference. Since islands are not continuous, each island 
has a certain level of housing stock. Household with continuous ability are filled into each island until the 
housing stock is exhausted. After assigning a boundary individual to the next least desirable jurisdiction 
and then filling this jurisdiction, the individuals who enter the next jurisdiction in principle might have an 
opposite rank of these two jurisdictions. If so, equilibrium would require that these individuals change 
places. We refer to this possibility as a reversal. The matching process is not in equilibrium when reversals 
happen. For our simulations, we verify that reversals of this sort never take place. 
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Dynamic Equilibrium 
 
Find a Steady State Equilibrium 
In the dynamic process, the difficulty in finding a steady state is the following 
simultaneity: 
(1) Without the information of housing price, firms cannot accurately predict future 
housing demand and make decisions on housing constructions.  
(2) Without the housing stock of each island, the shooting method cannot calculate rents, 
equilibrium assignment of households, and housing price.  
 
To solve this dilemma, our initial strategy is that myopic builders construct 
housing based on current housing prices assuming rents never change in the future. We 
use these prices to calculate housing stocks and new prices, and keep iterate on them until 
we reach the steady state. The key to this strategy is that firm knows what the expected 
rents and prices are in the steady state. As iterations carry on, the initial expectation of 
housing price will be modified gradually so that it equals the actual one. Thus we can use 
iterative process to find out optimal housing supply without knowing housing price in 
advance during the transition path to the steady state based on the assumption that what is 
true in the steady state is also true in the off-steady state path.  
In practice we must choose an initial housing stock to start with, and our model 
converges to the same steady state no matter what initial housing stock we choose. 
Because of this, we just choose an even housing stock distribution initially, and solve a 
single period equilibrium using the initial housing stock and calculate rent. Then a 
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forward-looking firm can derive the expected housing price using current rents assuming 
rents remain the same in the future, which is true in the steady state.  
      [ ] 1( ( )) (1 )* ( )t tt tE P s I G R sβ δ
−= − −      (2.6) 
After this, we estimate firm’s housing supply in the next period based on this 
expected price, and iterate on it to find the new rent, which is used to get the new housing 
supply as before. We will keep doing this until a steady state is found.  
  [ ]
1 1 1
1( ) * (1 )* * ( )*( )K tt t t t t t tr E P MP I G R s A L HS
ξ ξ
ξ ξ ξβ δ ξ
− −
−= = − −   (2.7) 
 
Find the transition path to the Equilibrium 
As described above, housing prices in the steady state are solely determined by 
rents. Thus firms can use the initial guess of housing price based on any housing stock to 
construct and adjust this expectation approaching steady state gradually. However, in the 
transition path to the steady state, current housing price are based on all future rents and 
rents are changing period by period. Thus firm needs to know all future rents to construct 
housing in the current period, and the calculation is much more complicated than that of 
the steady state calculation. In order to examine the path of the economy toward the 
steady state, a new solution strategy is used to get the housing price in the iterative 
process.  
First, calculate rents, housing stock and housing price in the initial steady state 
and final steady state as described before. 
Second, calculate housing construction and rents in the following 500 periods 
assuming myopic firm construct based on rents in the previous period. We choose such a 
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long period because we want to make sure during this length of time the economy return 
to steady state after the productivity shock. 
 Third, Following Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010), we calculate the whole 
sequence of housing prices backward from the final steady state using rents in each 
period. Housing price equals to the expected present value of all future rents after 
depreciation as 
0
( ) (1 ) ( )t j j t j tt t t j
j
P s E R s sβ δ
∞
+
+
=
 
= − 
 
∑ ; 
Four, firm construct housing based on the actual housing price, and a new 
sequence of rents and housing price can be obtained from equilibrium allocation of 
households in each period. 
Five, use these new path of housing prices as the basis to construct housing, 
obtain rents and housing prices in the new iteration, and keep iterating this process to get 
convergence. As iterations carry on, off-steady state housing prices based on the initial 
guess E(Pt+1) will be modified gradually approaching their true value. In the final 
iteration, housing prices which forward looking firm use to build should correctly predict 
actual housing price calculated using all future rents along the path to the steady state. 
 
2.3 Calibration and Parameters 
 
The model in Section 2 provides us an economic environment to calculate rents, 
and housing price in cities with different levels of productivity and amenity. With this 
model, we can examine how housing prices, rent premia for high amenity and price-to-
rent ratios evolve over time in a dynamic economy where people sort, housing price 
equilibrate wage difference and average wages are growing over time. As Gyourko, 
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Mayer and Sinai (2013) propose, one cause of the superstar city mechanism is the 
increasing number of high-income household nationally. To examine this effect, we 
calibrate our model so that the initial steady state productivity distribution matches the 
key moments of wage distribution in 1975 data. Then we engineer a national wide 
productivity increase of the observed magnitude, and ask how housing prices, rents and 
the rent premia for high amenity evolve over time. In our baseline model A, we create a 
productivity shock across the whole economy using a productivity shifter. Besides 
increasing productivity, we also change ability distribution by either increasing the 
variance in model B or increasing skewing in model C to examine model calibrated 
change in wages, rents, housing prices and price-to-rent ratios in low-amenity places and 
high-amenity places. 
 In our model, log productivity follows a normal distribution with mean µ and 
standard deviation σ. Using quadrature-based method from Tauchen and Hussey (1991), 
we obtain thirty Gaussian quadrature points to approximate the continuous productivity 
distribution. Following Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010), the mean and standard 
deviation of log productivity in the initial steady states are taken to be 17.78 and 0.084 to 
match the population weighted average real wage per job and cross-sectional coefficient 
of variation (CV) of real wage per job in 1975, respectively.13 To engineer a positive 
productivity shock, we linearly increase productivity level using a productivity shifter ζ 
to target model calibrated population weighted wage in 2007 at the real data. In order to 
choose these three parameters, we solve the model repeatedly until the three 
                                                             
13 Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) calculate population-weighted moments using nominal wage-per-
job data and number of jobs for each metropolitan area from Bureau of Economic Analysis Regional 
Economic Information System, and then deflate the nominal wage by a regional cost-of-living index 
excluding housing to get population weighted average real wage per job and CV of real wage per job for 
330 US metropolitan areas in 1975. 
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endogenously generated moments can perfectly match their counterparts in the real data. 
Except these three parameters determined in the calibration process, all other parameters 
are set externally to the conventional values, which are listed in Table 1. 
Households’ ability follow a truncated double-Pareto distribution with mean 
normalized to 1. We truncate the distribution from both tails to keep a compact support. 
In the baseline model, we choose the cross-sectional standard deviation of log ability, 
equals 0.079056 as Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010). Then in model B, we increase 
the variance of log ability from 0.079056 to 0.099056, and combine it with the increasing 
productivity levels to match the wage increase in the economy. 
The parameter ξ in the housing production function is inversely related to the 
fraction of land value in the housing construction costs, we set  ξ =0.7 to match the fact 
that land value contribute to about 30% of housing construction costs according to 
Albouy (2012). Housing is depreciated at a rate of 0.016 following Van Nieuwerburgh 
and Weill (2010). We choose the time discount factor β=0.951 and the capital rate rt 
=5.15% to match Primary Mortgage Market 30-year fixed rate mortgage rate between 
1974 and 2013. 
We choose two exogenous levels of amenity, which are set to be 1 and 1.05 in our 
model, to make sure there are enough mixing of the low-amenity high-productivity 
islands and high-amenity low-productivity islands. These numbers are not calibrated to 
the real data, but the amenity difference is sufficient so that neither amenity nor 
productivity differences dominate housing choices over the entire set of islands. 
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Table 2.1: Calibration Parameters in the Model 
Parameter
 
Descriptions Numbers Matches 
    
Calibration Parameters 
  
µ mean productivity level 17.78 1975 pw-avg real wage per job 
σ productivity dispersion 0.084 1975 pw-CV real wage per job 
ζ Productivity shifter 1.303 2007 pw-avg real wage per job  
     
External parameters 
  
Households 
  
β time discount factor 0.951 30-year fixed rate mortgage 
α non-housing consumption weights 0.5 
 
γ elasticity of Substitution between 
amenity and other consumption 
0.5 
 
ke 
constant ability dispersion in model A  17.889 Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) 
 2007 ability dispersion in model B 14.277 2007 pw-avg real wage per job
  
 Production   
δ depreciation rate of housing stock 0.016 Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill (2010) 
ξ nonland cost in housing construction 0.7 Albouy (2012) 
rt capital return rate 0.0515 30-year fixed rate mortgage 
 
 
2.4 Quantitative Results 
 
In this section, we investigate the model calibrated effect of productivity shock on 
wages, rents, housing prices and price-to-rent ratios in low-amenity places and high-
amenity places. We study the initial steady state in 1975, the economy’s transition from 
1975 until the new steady state after shock and the final steady state in three models with 
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different specifications on households’ ability. In the figures present in this section, the 
dotted line represents the initial state, the dashed line represents the final state, the solid 
line represents the transition path toward final steady state, and the dashed line with 
circles represents the real economy. 
 
2.4.1 Model A  
 
In Model A, we create a positive productivity shock while keep everything else 
unchanged from the 1975. Our main object of interest is the post-1975 evolution of rents, 
housing prices across metropolitan areas.  
The left panel of Figure 2.2 shows how the model transition of average wage 
evolves. As described before, our calibration parameters are picked so that population 
weighted cross-sectional mean of the real wage per job in the initial steady state is the 
same as in the 1975 data. Starting with 1975 data, we linearly increase productivity level 
for thirty-two years by multiplying the initial production distribution with a productivity 
shifter which is increasing period by period. We choose the productivity shifter so that 
the model calibrated population-weighted average real wages per job in 2007 is the same 
as that in the real economy. As plotted in the graph, population-weighted average of 
wages, which is driven by the exogenous productivity shifter we feed in the model, 
increase from 18 to around 23 in 2007, and then stays the same as in the final steady state. 
Note that we do not match the yearly change in wages along the transition path from 
1975 to 2007 because population growth rate and number of jobs per households are kept 
constant in our analysis. We do this because we are focusing on the effect of increasing 
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wages on the housing market due to the overall productivity shock. We know that 
allowing for the changes in these factors will also induce additional fluctuation in wage 
and distract our study. The middle panel and the right panel of Figure 2.2 show the 
changes in population-weighted rents and housing price in the initial and final steady 
state and also along the transition paths. Once after the productivity shock happens, 
housing price jumps suddenly in the first period because rents are expected to increase in 
the future. As such, profit maximizing firm will build more housing now, and therefore 
increase housing stock everywhere. These effects will cause rent to fall initially because 
of the excessive growing housing stock, and then rent will starts to increase when the 
effect of oversupply of housing disappear. 
 
Figure 2.2: The Effect of Increasing Productvity on Wages, Rents and Housing Prices 
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Now we will analyze housing price in low-amenity places and high-amenity 
places separately. As described in the previous section, amenity is a scare resource and 
only parts of cities are endowed with higher amenity. After productivity shock happens, 
there are more rich people nationally. As seen in below, the derivatives of the indirect 
utility function with respect to wages and amenity show how households’ marginal utility 
change due to the increase in amenity levels or wages in equilibrium. 
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The ratio of these two derivatives indicates the marginal rate of substation between wages 
and amenity. 
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Since 0<α<1, and 0<β<1, this equation demonstrates that households’ willing to pay for 
amenity is positively correlated with wage and rents, and negatively correlated with 
amenity level. This tells us that as incomes go up, people are more willing to consume 
more amenities, and therefore live in high amenity places.  
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We compare housing price by amenity by productivity tercile in Figure 2.3. The 
left panel shows housing price with low, median and high productivity level in low-
amenity places. It is obvious that the trends of these three terciles are very similar, 
although housing price is higher with a higher productivity level. The right panel presents 
housing prices in high-amenity places, which has very similar pattern as in low-amenity 
place. Note that the increases in the average housing price in these two groups are of 
about the same magnitude, so the increasing rate are actually smaller in high amenity 
place considering the fact that high amenity place has a higher initial value. Then we 
compare price-to-rent ratios in low-amenity places and in high-amenity places. There is 
an initial jump of price-to-rent ratios, which is consistent with the falling rent and surging 
housing price in the first period. Starting from period 1, price-to-rent ratio keeps 
increasing at a lower speed for about then year, and then falls to the lowest point in 2007 
because the rise in rent start to catch up with housing price now. After 2007, price-to-rent 
ratio increases gradually until it reaches steady state. It is noticeable that price-to-rent 
ratio in low-amenity places is always slightly higher, if not equals, than that in high-
amenity places. This phenomenon is inconsistent with the “superstar city effect” that high 
amenity places have higher rents in the future and higher price and price-to-rent ratio now.  
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Figure 2.3: Housing Price in Low and High Amenity Places by Productivity Terciles 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Price-to-Rent Ratios by Amenity 
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To investigate the reason why we get low price-to-rent ratio in high-amenity 
places, we first compare the after-shock transition path of population-weighted average 
rents in low-amenity places and high-amenity places. In Figure 2.4, we can see that the 
increases in the average rent in these two graphs are of about the same magnitude, the 
increasing rate is actually smaller in high amenity place because prices in high amenity 
place are higher initially. Given this information, it is shown that price-to-rent ratio is 
higher in low-amenity places based on the derivation below. 
From the asset price literature, housing price equals the expected present value of 
all future rents in a continuous growth model without considering risk adjustment. 
         0
0
t
tP re dt
δ
∞
−= ∫           (2.12) 
Where rt is the rent in period t and δ is the discount rate. Suppose rent increases at a 
constant rate g so that 0
gt
tr r e= , then we obtain price-to-rent ratio in the current period as 
below: 
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Taking derivative to g, it follows that the price-to-rent ratio is increasing in rent 
growth rate. 
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−
       (2.14) 
As shown in Figure 2.5, rent has a smaller increasing in high amenity places, and 
therefore lower price-to-rent ratio.  
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Figure 2.5: Rents in Low-Amenity Places and High-Amenity Places 
  
In order to investigate why rents increase faster in low-amenity places, we 
compare rent premia in high-amenity places for different productivity levels. Rent premia 
is calculated as the ratio between rent in high amenity places and that in low-amenity 
places with the same productivity level, which represents marginal price of amenity for 
different people. 
Let’s look at the rent premium in each period, so start with the indirect utility 
function
1
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. 
Because a boundary household with ability ej+1 is indifferent between living in 
two adjacent cities. They can always live in a better place paying higher rent, or live in 
the other place paying lower rent, so the following condition always holds.  
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First let’s consider a simple case when 1j jQ Q += . Replacing Qj by Qj+1 in 
equation (), we can derive 11 1
1
j j
j j
A A
R Rα α
+
− −
+
= . Because this equality holds at every boundary 
between two cites, thus for any k consecutive places with the same amenity, e.g. 
1 ...j j j kQ Q Q+ += = = , we have
1
,1 1 1
1
... .j j j k j k
j j j k
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R R Rα α α
+ +
− − −
+ +
= = = =  
Now let’s consider a more complicated case when 1j jQ Q +≠ . We first compare 
rent of island A1 with that of B1, which are shown in Figure 2.6. 
 
Figure 2.6:  Rent Premium Comparison 
 
 
 
 
 
Suppose 1,j L j HQ Q Q Q+= = , following the boundary condition equation (2.15), 
we have 1 1 11 1
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For two adjacent island A27 and B1, we have 
      1 27 1 11 1
,27 ,1
( ) ( )j jL H
L H
e A e A
Q Q
R R
β β β β
α α
λ λ+ +
− −+ = +      (2.16)
 
Low(A) 
High(B) 
Rent Premium? 
Rent Premium? 
1 2 3 27 26 25 29 28 30 
1 2 3 27 26 25 29 28 30 
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We also know that 1 2 271 1 1
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L L L
A A A
R R Rα α α− − −
= = = , plugging this in equation (2.16), we have: 
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Divide equation (2.17) by
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Rearranging this equation, equation (2.18) can be simplified as below: 
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Now we want to compare rents in island A30 and B30.  
Replacing equation () with 1,j H j LQ Q Q Q+= =  ,we have the boundary condition as below: 
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Using the same logic to replace the boundary island with island B30, we have: 
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Now we have the rent premium for island B30 with respect to A30 
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From the comparison between equation (2.19) and equation (2.23), we get 
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It is shown in the data that
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This equation tells us that as wages go up due to the increase in productivity, rent 
premia for high amenity places decreases. This finding is inconsistent with our intuition 
that the willingness to pay for high amenity should be positively correlated with wages. 
This inconsistency comes from the fact that, as productivity goes up, returns to 
productivity increase with ability make amenities less important in the bidding process 
even though the willingness to pay for high amenity goes up. Because rent differentials 
This rent premium by productivity are plotted in Figure 2.7. In each period, as 
productivity goes up, rent premium falls, then stays the same in the middle, and finally 
falls. This is consistent with our derivation that rent premium is negatively correlated 
with productivity, and the flat line in the middle comes from the islands in the bracket of 
Figure 2.6 where people are sorted into the many consecutive low-amenity places 
initially before going to the high-amenity places. Another feature of the rent premium is 
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that rent premium for high amenity falls for all islands after productivity shock because 
of the declining importance of amenity compared with productivity. And this can be seen 
from equation (). Increasing productivity exerts downward force on the left side on the 
equation, and makes ,1
,1
H
L
R
R
smaller. 
 
Figure 2.7: Rent Premia for High Amenity by Productivity in Model A 
 
 
2.4.2 Model B  
 
In model A, there is no evidence of superstar city effect when population incomes 
increase due to the change in the metropolitan environment. In order to create a situation 
with increasing number of high-income household associated with population prior to 
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sorting, we increase the standard deviation of log ability combined with the increasing 
productivity in model B. As described before, ability is distributed following a double-
Pareto distribution, and this distribution with a higher variance has larger tails in both 
sides. All the core results are extremely similar as in model A, e.g. price-to-rent ratio and 
the rent premium in the high amenity places are nearly identical, except that we have 
higher levels of rents and housing prices. 
 
2.4.3 Model C  
 
In model B, we increase the number of high income households by increasing the 
standard deviation of log ability. By doing this, we increase both the number of rich 
people and poor people because ability follows double Pareto distribution, which is 
approximately symmetric14. We have a concern that the nonexistent superstar city effect 
because the increase of poor people offset the rise of rich people. In this model, we cut 
down larger tails with a probability of 0.1 at each side in the initial steady state, and then 
starting from period 1 we gradually shift the left tail to the right as shown in Figure 2.8. 
In this case, we have a strongly skewed ability distribution with increasing mean. We 
want to investigate the combined effect of increasing productivity and surging household 
ability on rents and housing price differently by productivity by amenity.   
 
 
 
                                                             
14 This distribution is nearly but exactly symmetric. The left truncation point equals 0.35, and right 
truncation point equals 2.79 when we only truncate very small tails with a probability of 1e-8. 
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Figure 2.8: Increase Ability Skewness by Shifting the Left Tail to the Right 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.9:  Rent Premium for High Amenity by Productivity in Model C 
 
 
Log(Xe) 
 64 
 
Figure 2.9 presents price differentials between low and high amenity in model C.  
We can see that with a skewed distribution of ability, rent premia for high amenity drop 
much faster than the ones without ability change. The reason is evident in equation (2.19). 
After this change, ability difference between low-amenity and high-amenity places are 
even larger. Rising ability exerts upward force on the right side on the equation, and 
makes ,1
,1
H
L
R
R
smaller. 
 
2.5 Conclusion 
 
Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai (2006) suggest that inelastic supply of land in 
“superstar cities” –high amenity places– and a continuing increasing number of high-
income households are two driving forces of the increasing price dispersion and rent-
price ratios across locations.  
In our study, we investigate the effect of amenities difference on rent, housing 
prices, and price-to-rent ratio over time in three models with different specifications. We 
found that as productivity rises, the increasing returns to productivity with ability make 
amenities less important in the bidding process although households’ marginal utility 
from increases in amenity levels goes up.  This effect is even present with a skewed 
ability distribution. 
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Chapter 3 
The Spillover Effects of Foreclosures 
 
Abstract:  
The spillover effect of foreclosure has been mostly examined via an effect on 
housing prices, especially in close proximity to foreclosed properties. Controlling for the 
negative equity of housing units using both county level and census tract level housing 
price indices, this paper studies non-price spillover effects of foreclosure potentially due 
to the information or norms that are created by exposure to foreclosure of housing units at 
the neighborhood level. We use a reduced form Instrumental Variable (IV) strategy to 
investigate whether foreclosures are more likely in neighborhoods with more foreclosures. 
We find that significant neighborhood spillovers exist without controlling for 
neighborhood specific trends, but all effects are attenuated away without any reduction in 
the precision of the standard errors after allowing foreclosure pattern over time to vary by 
neighborhood observables. Our analysis shows that there is no spillover effect of 
foreclosure after controlling for effects that operate through prices and systematic 
patterns of trends in foreclosure at the neighborhood level. 
 66 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
Most previous studies on the external effects of foreclosed properties have focused 
on the impact of foreclosures on housing prices in the same neighborhood and in many 
cases the impact of spatially proximate foreclosures. Recent evidence of spillover effects 
suggests that these effects are due to a lack of maintenance of the properties and vandalism 
(Harding, Rosenblatt and Yao (2009); Campbell, Giglio and Pathak (2011)). Such effects on 
prices may cause additional foreclosures by eroding the equity of nearby homeowners. A 
policy recommendation is therefore made that financial institutions, who take over the 
houses from their previous owners, should keep better maintenance of foreclosed houses so 
that the loss in the neighborhood quality can be minimized (Campbell, Giglio and Pathak 
(2011)). A detailed literature review of the spillover effect of foreclosure on housing prices 
is discussed in Section 2.  
However, there has been very little work on whether there are non-price contagion 
effects of foreclosure of housing units at the neighborhood level, which might arise through 
information sharing or through the effect of reducing the stigma associated with foreclosure. 
For example, people may feel less scared about foreclosure when they see that many of their 
neighbors who did not pay their mortgages are able to live in their houses for a long time. It 
is also possible that social norms have changed so that people feel foreclosure is not that 
embarrassing. If there exist such non-price spillovers, policy makers may need to take some 
action to reduce the societal cost of the negative externalities. 
To isolate the effect of neighborhood foreclosure externalities associated with 
current housing price level, we control for the negative equity of housing units using both 
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county level and tract level housing price indices. In addition, because the price effects 
appear to arise at very low levels of geography, we explicitly focus on foreclosures 
happening at the census tract and census block group, which are higher levels of geography 
than earlier studies. Specifically, we study whether individual foreclosures are more likely 
in neighborhoods that have more housing units at risk of foreclosure. A reduced form IV 
strategy is used to control for the endogeneity of neighborhood foreclosure risk based on the 
timing of when housing units in the neighborhood were purchased. Our empirical study 
finds that significant neighborhood spillovers exist without controlling for neighborhood 
specific trends, but they vanish and are quite precisely estimated after allowing 
neighborhood foreclosure pattern to vary over time by neighborhood observables. The 
results are robust at both census tract and block group levels.  
The outline of the article is as follows. The next section discusses the previous 
studies on foreclosures and foreclosure spillover effects. The third section describes the data 
we use and presents summary statistics about the variables in this study. The fourth section 
presents our methodology. The fifth section describes the identification strategy. The sixth 
section presents the estimations and empirical results. The last section concludes. 
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3.2 Foreclosure Studies 
 
Due to the recent flood of foreclosures on residential mortgages, there have been 
many studies on the consequence of foreclosures on the individual in default and on the 
households in the neighborhood of the foreclosed properties. Molloy and Shan (2013) find 
that foreclosure does not severely reduce households’ housing consumption following the 
foreclosure, although it considerably raises the probability of moving. Brevoort and Cooper 
(2013) examine how the credit performance of borrowers changes following a mortgage 
foreclosure, and they find that the credit scores decline sharply around the time of a 
foreclosure start and in the years that follow. They argue that it takes a very long time for 
credit scores to return to the pre-foreclosure level, if at all, and especially for prime 
borrowers.  
Several studies focus on the negative externalities of foreclosure on the houses in 
the neighborhood. Due to the impact of negative equity on foreclosure, the price effects of 
foreclosure may also cause foreclosure spillovers through increased levels of negative 
equity. Immergluck and Smith (2006) find that a foreclosure causes a 0.9% decline in 
house value for all single family homes within one eighth of a mile. Lin, Rosenblatt and 
Yao (2009) control for zip and quarter FE separately and show that the most severe 
spillover effect is an 8.7% discount on neighborhood property values, and this effect 
gradually declines to anywhere between -1.2% to -1.7% by time of foreclosure and with the 
unit’s distance from the subject property. Leonard and Murdoch (2009) use a spatial 
autoregressive model to control for both the spatial depedence in housing prices and in the 
errors. Their estimates show that an additional foreclosure decreases a sale within 250 feet 
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by approximately $1,666. These papers use hedonic price regressions to identify the 
contagion effect neiborhood foreclosures by including measures or indicators of nearby 
distressed properties as additional independent variables. 
Some studies on foreclosure externalities focus on addressing bias from 
unobservable factors at the neighborhood level that might vary over the timing of either the 
original home purchase or the foreclosure. Harding, Rosenblatt and Yao (2009) provide 
robust evidence of a contagion discount by simultaneously estimating the local price trend 
and the incremental price impact of nearby foreclosures controlling for sale year fixed 
effects (FE) and neighborhood by purchase year FE’s. Campbell, Giglio and Pathak (2011) 
control for census tract by current year FE and identify the effect of foreclosure by focusing 
on foreclosures that are very close to the sale, i.e. using within tract variation. Their results 
suggest that each foreclsure which takes places 0.05 miles away lowers the price of a house 
by about 1 percent. To reduce the omitted variable bias, Gerardi, Rosenblatt, Willen and 
Yao (2012) include block group by purchase year FE’s in a repeat sale regression, where the 
control for repeat sales also controls for block group by current year FE’s. They find that the 
negative price spillover effects of distressed properites on nearby home values are 
economically small, and are very sensitive to the condition of the distressed property. The 
studies above also show that the spillover effects of foreclosures are exaggerated if not 
controlling for neighborhood trends in foreclosure.  
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3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Price Indices Estimation 
 
Based on the home purchase transaction in San Diego during 2002-2010, we 
calculate the housing price index both at the county level and at the tract level. These price 
indices are then used to construct the individual property’s current LTV and the associated 
negative equity variable, which are included in our model to control for the effect of the 
pricing change over time. 
The county housing price index is developed by estimating a traditional hedonic 
sales price model: 
        jty c j ty jtyP Zβ δ ε= + +         (3.1) 
where jtyP  is the logarithm of the sales price of house j, jZ is a vector of housing attributes 
and tyδ  is a quarter t by year y fixed effect. The resulting price index (𝑃�) is  
         
5
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tyP
Exp
Exp
δ
δ
=         (3.2) 
where 
5
tyδ  is a five quarter moving average of 
5
tyδ  centered on quarter t of year y.   
In our study, the existence of neighborhood non-price spillover effects depends on 
how successfully we can isolate the price effect of foreclosure from it. In order to achieve 
this, we estimate housing price indices at census tract level and control for the pricing 
changes over time. Census tract housing price indices are obtained from a semi-parametric 
kernel smoothing technique based on Robinson (1988) and Stock (1989). Compared with 
the traditional hedonic price models, non-parametric kernel estimation works better when 
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transaction volume in some tract is too thin to obtain accurate estimates. To make this study 
computational feasible we choose our initial rule-of-thumb bandwidth and eventually we 
choose the optimal bandwidth in the context where the bandwidth varies over space. In 
regions with very thin data, the bandwidth is wider. In regions with a lot of data, the 
bandwidth is narrower. This process is done in several steps as below: 
First, we predict the value of each variable from a weighted average of all the 
transactions in the sample based on normal distribution, and then obtain the residuals for 
these variables from the difference between the actual value and the predicted value. The 
predicted value is calculated from the kernel estimator based on the Silverman's rule-of-
thumb bandwidth, which is defined as: 
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Here Zik represents the smoothing variables for unit i in three dimensions (k=3), i.e. 
longitude, latitude and time; Xi(z) represent the logarithm of the sales price P and other 
structural controls of house i; Bk is the bandwidth of dimension k; and f is the probability 
density function for normal distribution. 
Second, we estimate regression coefficients in a hedonic price model using the 
residuals from the predicted values in the first step. Then quality-adjusted housing prices iP  
can be obtained from the difference between the observed sales price and the predicted 
value in the hedonic model.  
        () )( ii i i iP XP Xβ ε− = − +        (3.4) 
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          i i iP XP β= −          (3.5) 
Third, we cluster these quality-adjusted housing prices at the tract-year-quarter level 
to get the average housing price of each tract-year-quarter. Assuming they follow normal 
distribution, we use a standard omit-own cross-validation approach according to Stone 
(1984) to choose the optimal bandwidth in three dimensions-longitude, latitude and time. 
Four, around the bandwidth chosen in step three, we vary spatial bandwidths 
dynamically following Terrell and Scott (1992). In specific, we get adaptive bandwidth by 
scaling the bandwidth by the square root of ratio between average denominator across the 
sample and that in each census tract. The bandwidth for tract j of dimension k is defined as: 
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where Bk is the optimal bandwidth using cross-validation approach; and T and I stand for the 
total numbers of quarters and tracts in the sample. 
Last, housing price indices at each quarter and census tract centroid are calculated 
based on these average quality-adjusted housing price and dynamic bandwidth using the 
same kernel smoothing techniques in step one.  
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3.3.2 Instrument for Neighborhood Equity 
 
A substantial literature view mortgage as an option contract in which the homeowner 
can put this option if under water and call it if above water (Ambrose, Capone and Deng 
(2001), Kau, Keenan and Kim (1994)). According to the “option theory”, a homeowner with 
positive equity will never default because he still has some money left by selling his house 
and paying off the mortgage. Conversely, a homeowner may choose to default strategically 
when the market prices of his house fall below the outstanding balance on the mortgage. 
Even though some trigger events, such as job loss, divorce or serious health problems, could 
render homeowners to be in insolvency and then default on their mortgages, negative equity 
is often viewed as a necessary condition for mortgage default. Therefore, predicted fraction 
of properties in negative equity in each neighborhood can be used as a proxy for 
neighborhood foreclosure risk. 
In this study we calculate the neighborhood foreclosure risk instruments at the 
census tract level and census block group level because we want to study non-price effects. 
And we believe that higher level of geography will help separate non-price from price 
effects, which have been shown to operate at a very low level of geography. In addition, as 
described in the previous section, we can measure housing price changes accurately at the 
census tract level to better control for any price effects. The foreclosure risk at the 
neighborhood is measured using a proxy (or instrument) 

gTNB for the risk of negative equity 
based on the timing of moves into a neighborhood in each year. To ensure its exogeneity, 
the proxy is calculated as the fraction of home purchases likely to be in negative equity for 
each current quarter at the census tract or block group level based on the quarter of purchase, 
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the countywide distribution of initial loan to value ratio (LTV) and the trends in countywide 
housing prices. The overall LTV distribution for the whole county by quarter of year is 
created as 
      1( )bt b jt bD Fr LTV LTV LTV−= < ≤       (3.7) 
where Fr represents the fraction of sales that meet this condition and bLTV  is the upper 
bound of each LTV bin b. 
Then, for each purchase quarter (p) current quarter during the crisis (t), we calculate 
a predicted fraction of home purchases likely to be in negative equity. This fraction is 
created by summing the product of the empirical frequency countywide (Dbp) associated 
with a specific purchase year LTV bin (b) and a one/zero indicator (I) for whether the 
current LTV is in negative equity over all bins for a given purchase quarter and current 
quarter. Then the number of houses falling into negative equity at each neighborhood (g) 
purchase quarter(p) and current quarter (t) is simply created by multiplying the number of 
transactions (Ngpt) in a given purchase quarter and neighborhood and countywide fraction of 
purchases being in negative equity of that purchase quarter and current quarter. We sum the 
numbers over all purchase quarters and scale by the number of transactions in the 
neighborhood and purchase quarter (Ngt) as below: 
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where 1bLTV − is the lower bound of the LTV bin (in this way we have the most conservative 
LTVs), and B stands for the number of bins. It is evident that our instrument is identified by 
the difference in the timing of purchases at the neighborhood level. If one neighborhood has 
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more purchases earlier before crisis when housing price is not that high, it suffers small risk 
of foreclosure after crisis happens. 
 
3.3.3 Instrument for Individual Equity  
 
We have a concern that the LTV of the individual borrower might be endogenous. 
As a robustness check, we calculate a proxy 
i
igyqtNE
−
for each unit’s predictions of negative 
equity omitting any information associated with that unit’s specific equity status. This 
instrument is constructed using the quarter of purchase, the LTV distribution for the tract 
and year, and the census tract level price indices based on the timing of moves into a 
neighborhood in each year. Assuming that the timing of a particular purchase and year 
specific neighborhood LTV are exogenous, this instrument is entirely independent of the 
individual’s choices of where to live within the county and of the loan to value ratio for their 
mortgage. For each unit (i) in the neighborhood (g) with a purchase year (y) and quarter of 
purchase year (q), the predicted probability of being in negative equity at current quarter (t) 
are shown as below: 
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As noted by Guryan, Kroft and Notowidigdo (2009), there exists a negative 
correlation between this observation’s equity status and that of its neighborhood by purchase 
quarter cohort because the instrument for individual equity is calculated by omitting its own 
attributes and the number of observations in each census tract by purchase year is very small. 
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In order to avoid Guryan bias and obtain consistent estimates, we include an additional 
control to capture the negative correlation arising from omitting self. In specific, we separate 
the constructed variable for  individual’s equity status into a contaminated  ( )igqt
i
igqtNE NE
−
−
and uncontaminated component (
i
igqtNE
−
) and include both controls following Fletcher, Ross 
and Zhang (2013). For each unit (i) in the neighborhood (g) with a purchase year (y) and 
quarter of purchase year (q) at current quarter (t), the Guryan control of the instrument for 
individual negative equity is defined as below:    
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3.3.4 Estimation Equations 
 
To examine whether houses are more likely to be foreclosed at the neighborhood 
with higher foreclosure risks, we regress the probability of receiving a Notice of Default 
(NOD, which starts the foreclosure process) on the neighborhood measure of negative 
equity. We control for the price change via each unit’s current equity status igptNE  so that the 
price effects are isolated.  
To effectively separate foreclosure externality from neighborhood specific trends in 
foreclosure, we implement a limited triple difference model controlling for the pairs of the 
three sources of variations: neighborhood, purchase quarter and current quarter. 
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First, we control for census tract/block group by purchase year FE to remove 
neighborhood foreclosure risks that are unique to the time when individuals purchased into 
the neighborhood. This is equivalent to using repeat sales price models like Harding, 
Rosenblatt and Yao (2009) and Gerardi, Rosenblatt, Willen and Yao (2012) since individual 
FE subsume the purchase quarter by location FE. Second, we also include purchase year by 
current year fixed effect to capture any timing patterns associated with overall foreclosure 
tendencies (e.g. people who bought right before the crisis might have a different time path 
of foreclosure). Third, since our neighborhood instruments vary by census tract/block group 
by current year, they would be unidentified if we control for neighborhood by current year 
FE’s as in Campbell, Giglio and Pathak (2011) and Gerardi, Rosenblatt, Willen and Yao 
(2012). We begin with a way FE model controlling for each unit’s actual Negative Equity, 
neighborhood by purchase year FE and purchase year by current year fixed effect. For each 
unit (i) in the neighborhood (g) with a purchase quarter (p), the probability of receiving a 
NOD at current quarter (t) is modeled as: 
    1 2 3 gtigpt igp igpt gp pt igptNOD X NE NBβ β β α δ ε= + + + + +    (3.11) 
Here Xigp is a list of dummy variables indicating the loan attributes of each individual 
i at the neighborhood g with a purchase quarter p. These attributes include whether the sale 
is an arm’s length transaction, whether there are subordinate liens, whether the liens are 
fixed or adjustable rate mortgages, whether the sale happens within two years after the 
house was built, and the original LTV bins. NEigpt is the proxy for individual foreclosure risk. 
gpα and ptδ stand for census tract/block group by purchase quarter FE, and purchase quarter 
by current quarter FE, respectively. 
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We have a concern that the uncontrolled neighborhood by current year FE might 
affect our results. Therefore, we use pre-crisis neighborhood observable foreclosure risk 
(Nb_Obsg) interacting with current year dummies (Dummy_Yr) to control for the 
neighborhood specific trends in foreclosure based on the observable attributes only. These 
pre-crisis neighborhood observables are calculated as the averages of key mortgage risk 
factors: fraction of sales that are arm’s length transaction, fraction of mortgages with 
subordinate liens, fraction of liens that are adjustable rate mortgages, fraction of sales 
happening within two years after the house was built, and fractions of sales in each original 
LTV bins.  

1 2 3 _ * _gtigpt igp igpt g gp pt igptNOD X NE NB Nb Obs Dummy Yrβ β β α δ ε= + + + + + + (3.12) 
Here _ gNb Obs is the pre-crisis neighborhood observable foreclosure risk, and _Curr Yr  is 
the dummy variable for current year. 
It is likely that individual actual negative equity variable might be endogenous, we 
then estimate a model with instruments for individual negative equity as below: 
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3.4 Data 
 
We use Assessor’s record data on all single family houses in San Diego County, CA, 
from DataQuick Information Systems (DataQuick), which is a supplier of real estate data 
employing a database of over 120 million U.S. residential properties. This Assessors data 
contains the information of all liens, Notice of Default (NOD) and Notice of Trustee Sale 
(NOTS). We also use the Dataquick History file to identify housing transactions from the 3rd 
quarter in 2002 to 2nd in 2010. This History file includes all the structural or site-specific 
characteristics: the address of the housing unit, the date of the sale, the sales price, the loan 
amounts for all liens taken out when the home was purchased, whether the sale is an arm’s 
length transaction, whether there are subordinate liens, whether each loan was an adjustable 
rate or fixed rate mortgage and detailed property attributes including whether a single family 
property, whether a condominium, number of bedrooms, number of baths, square feet of 
living space, lot size, and the age of the house.  We geocode the addresses to get the 
longitude and latitude of each unit and then use these accurate addresses to estimate census 
tract price indices using non-parametric kernel smoothing. This data is also used to estimate 
county level housing price indices, calculate combined loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and 
create the expected loan to value ratio for each neighborhood, purchase year and current 
year.  
These two datasets are merged by unique property ID. We divide the sample into a 
pre-crisis period (before 2nd quarter in 2006) and a post-crisis period (after 3rd quarter in 
2006). For each housing unit, we can identify the most recent home purchase during the pre-
crisis period, deleting all units for which no sale was observed between 2nd quarter in 2002 
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and 2nd quarter in 2006. Then we construct our sample by stacking the foreclosure data for 
these pre-crisis home purchases by quarter during the post-crisis period until a foreclosure is 
observed in the post-crisis period, and all future years are dropped. Note that in order to line 
up with the onset of the crisis in the fall of 06, years run from the 3rd quarter of one year to 
the 2nd quarter of the next. The stacked sample estimates the risk of pre-crisis transactions 
going through foreclosure in each quarter after the housing crisis starts. 
We have 146,499 units of single family houses in the sample that were purchased 
during the pre-crisis period and did not have a foreclosure prior to the crisis. After stacking 
the sample by quarter, the sample size increases to 1,718,428. The description and summary 
statistics of all the variables are reported in Table 3.1. Panel A displays summary 
information for the dependent variable and time-varying variables. More than 22% of the 
single family houses bought between the 3rd quarter in 2002 and 2nd quarter in 2006 receive 
NOD during the after-crisis period. The first part 1 of this Panel presents three 
neighborhood foreclosure risk instruments at the census tract level used in this study. These 
instruments suggest that neighborhood foreclosure risks vary dramatically by neighborhood 
by crisis quarter, with around 87.4% houses being in negative equity at most and 2.7% at 
least. Part 2 of Panel A presents all the individual LTV controls with both actual LTV and 
the LTV instruments in the after-stacked sample. These variables vary by neighborhood by 
purchase quarter by current quarter. Panel B shows all the static variables we use. The first 
half of this panel presents the summary statistics of the original mortgage underwriting 
controls. Part 2 includes all the variables of neighborhood observable foreclosure risks, 
which are calculated as the fraction of arm’s length transactions, transactions with 
subordinate liens, transactions with an adjustable rate, and falling into several LTV Bins, out 
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of the entire sample in each census tract. It is clear that the foreclosure risks vary 
dramatically across census tract.  
 
Table 3.1: Variable Name, Brief Descriptions and Summary Statistics  
Variables Description Mean 
Std 
Dev Min Max 
  
    
  
Panel A. Time Varying Variables         
  
    
  
0.Dependent Variable 
   
  
NOD Notice of Default 0.2210 0.4149 0 1 
  
    
  
1. Variables changing by Neighborhood*Current Year 
   
  
Neighborhood Variables at tract level 
   
  
fr_negltv_tract neighborhood neg. equity 0.3349 0.2008 0.0027 0.874 
fr_negltv30_tract neighborhood neg.e equity >30 0.1331 0.1246 0 0.68 
avg_negamount_tract 
neighborhood negative equity 
amount 
0.0947 0.0789 0.0006 0.4257 
  
    
  
2. Variables changing by Neighborhood*Purchase Year*Current Year Based on Tract Price Indices 
Actual Negative Equity 
   
  
NE actual ltv>1 0.3863 0.4869 0 1 
NE30 actual ltv>1.3 0.1368 0.3436 0 1 
LTV Bins 
70-90 0.7<actual ltv<0.9 0.2481 0.4319 0 1 
90-110 0.9<actual ltv<1.1 0.2304 0.4211 0 1 
      
130-150 1.3<actual ltv<1.5 0.0732 0.2604 0 1 
More than 150 actual ltv>1.5 0.0636 0.2441 0 1 
  
    
  
Predicted Negative Equity 
   
  
NE  predicted ltv>1 0.3863 0.3527 0 1 
 30NE  predicted ltv>1.3 0.1367 0.2548 0 1 
LTV Bins 
70-90 0.7<predicted ltv<0.9 0.2479 0.2013 0 1 
90-110 0.9<predicted ltv<1.1 0.2305 0.2025 0 1 
110-130 1.1<predicted ltv<1.3 0.1396 0.1813 0 1 
130-150 1.3<predicted ltv<1.5 0.0731 0.1442 0 1 
More than 150 predicted ltv>1.5 0.0636 0.1771 0 1 
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Table 3.1: Continued 
Panel B. Static Variables         
1.Loan attributes 
Adjrmor whether the liens are adjustable rate mortgages 0.5776 0.4939 0 1 
Suborddebt whether there are subordinate liens 0.4200 0.4936 0 1 
Armslength whether the sale is an arm’s length transaction 0.9278 0.2588 0 1 
Lessthan2yrs 
whether the sale happens within two years after 
the house was built 0.0822 0.2747 0 1 
LTVR80 80<original ltv<95 0.2619 0.4397 0 1 
LTVR95 95<original ltv<100 0.2130 0.4094 0 1 
LTVR100 100<original ltv<110 0.0138 0.1168 0 1 
LTVR110 original ltv>110 0.0186 0.1350 0 1 
  
    
  
2. Tract Average Attributes 
   
  
Adjrmor whether the liens are adjustable rate mortgages 0.6522 0.1006 0 1 
Suborddebt whether there are subordinate liens 0.4811 0.1288 0 1 
Armslength whether the sale is an arm’s length transaction 0.9463 0.0545 0.5 1 
Lessthan2yrs 
whether the sale happens within two years after 
the house was built 0.0320 0.0678 0 0.667 
LTVR80 80<original ltv<95 0.2537 0.0816 0 1 
LTVR95 95<original ltv<100 0.2756 0.1740 0 0.75 
LTVR100 100<original ltv<110 0.0130 0.0232 0 0.314 
LTVR110 original ltv>110 0.0128 0.0174 0 0.2 
 
3.5 Identification Strategy  
 
In order to give a sense of the magnitude of variation generated over time, Table 3.2 
presents the key attributes of the home purchase transaction by cohort and by census tract 
terciles created using the increase in the predicted fractions of houses in negative equity 
between the third quarter of 2006 and the second quarter of 2010. Each cell contains the 
fraction of housing transactions in the subsample of census tracts terciles by increase in 
negative equity with a specific mortgage attribute for the cohort. The comparison across 
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tracts acts as a balancing test where differences across cohorts in the difference across tracts 
imply that mortgage composition changes systematically over purchase year. 
When we compare across cohorts, the differences are very large for some attributes, 
i.e. the 2002-2003 cohort has less adjustable rate mortgages than 2003-2004 cohort, 2004-
2005 cohort and 2005-2006 cohort. These types of differences can be explicitly captured by 
the use of purchase year fixed effects. Although there are some notable differences across 
cohorts, the differences across terciles are either small or follow the same pattern across 
cohorts for all three terciles when not small, and so are captured by tract FEs. For example, 
when we move from the 1st tercile to the 3rd one, the fraction of transactions with original 
loan to value ratios higher than 0.95 increases first and then declines, both in the whole 
sample and in the four cohorts with different purchase years. These results suggest that this 
model does not contain strong interaction between changes in mortgage composition across 
time and the equity loss across tracts that are used to identify the model. 
Because our neighborhood foreclosure risk instruments vary by neighborhood and 
current quarter, this variable will be unidentified if we control for the neighborhood by 
current quarter FE. We have a concern that uncontrolled foreclosure trends at the 
neighborhood might contribute to the spillover effects. However, our instrument of the 
individual loan's LTV varies by neighborhood, purchase year and current year, thus they can 
be identified with the three pair-wise FE's.  
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Table 3.2: Initial Loan Attributes, by Cohort and Extent of Predicted Negative Equity 
Increases in Census Tracts 
 
  low increase middle increase high increase 
Adjrmor Rate-All 0.6217445 0.6431665 0.6606721 
Cohort 02-03 0.3845595 0.3699637 0.3920973 
Cohort 03-04 0.6362006 0.6459226 0.6660947 
Cohort 04-05 0.7723895 0.786333 0.7690773 
Cohort 05-06 0.6876131 0.7037089 0.6924003 
Suborddebt-All 0.4351781 0.499736 0.4673416 
Cohort 02-03 0.3179324 0.3362442 0.3231317 
Cohort 03-04 0.4146468 0.4677302 0.4396706 
Cohort 04-05 0.4950246 0.5574449 0.5081186 
Cohort 05-06 0.5171886 0.6020458 0.5301161 
Arms Length Transaction-All 0.9306939 0.9446205 0.9169545 
Cohort 02-03 0.9154604 0.9460488 0.9024211 
Cohort 03-04 0.9326662 0.9602479 0.9170899 
Cohort 04-05 0.939539 0.9474589 0.9182599 
Cohort 05-06 0.9345859 0.9238745 0.923762 
Less Than 2years-All 0.091089 0.0238171 0.0794726 
Cohort 02-03 0.1394672 0.046948 0.1491458 
Cohort 03-04 0.1390062 0.0364559 0.1476321 
Cohort 04-05 0.0537851 0.0110814 0.0436686 
Cohort 05-06 0.02373 0.0057755 0.0185932 
ltvr80-All 0.2638038 0.254524 0.2432497 
Cohort 02-03 0.272523 0.295262 0.2799497 
Cohort 03-04 0.2798056 0.2757598 0.2643789 
Cohort 04-05 0.2591636 0.2393326 0.2345248 
Cohort 05-06 0.240501 0.215921 0.2131296 
ltvr95-All 0.1998436 0.2983383 0.2629689 
Cohort 02-03 0.1257849 0.2001556 0.1779688 
Cohort 03-04 0.1662521 0.2562463 0.2396019 
Cohort 04-05 0.2386321 0.3421857 0.2877805 
Cohort 05-06 0.2753653 0.3738779 0.3053132 
ltvr100-All 0.012192 0.0152619 0.0147682 
Cohort 02-03 0.0164585 0.0296559 0.0289278 
Cohort 03-04 0.0112223 0.0156899 0.0158545 
Cohort 04-05 0.006361 0.0085976 0.0105292 
Cohort 05-06 0.0153097 0.0105073 0.0102894 
ltvr110-All 0.0148251 0.0179904 0.0148873 
Cohort 02-03 0.0220768 0.0209234 0.0243161 
Cohort 03-04 0.0149824 0.0122618 0.0166095 
Cohort 04-05 0.0116513 0.0089797 0.0107509 
Cohort 05-06 0.010508 0.0315218 0.0124556 
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Here we estimate a model of foreclosure as a function of loan to value ratio using 
similar instruments for the individual loan's LTV with three different sets of controls: (1) 
two way FE; (2) three way FE; (3) two way FE plus neighborhood trends.  
       igtT igt gt tT igtTNOD Xβ α δ ε= + + +      (3.13) 
      igtT igt gt gT tT igtTNOD Xβ α γ δ ε= + + + +      (3.14) 
    _ * _igtT igt gt tT igtTNOD X Nb Obs Curr Yrβ α δ ε= + + + +   (3.15) 
Here gTγ  controls for census tract/block group by current year. 
The results of these three models are reported in Table 3.3. It is clear that the 
results change a lot when we move from the two way FE's to the three way FE's. In panel 
A, the coefficients of the predicted LTV variables are positive and significant when you 
use either tract price indices or county price indices. In panel B, the coefficients for LTV 
less than 1.1 are not significant any more, and they even have the wrong sign. For LTV 
greater than 1.1, the magnitude of coefficients drops by more than a half. These results 
suggest that failure to include the neighborhood by current year FE in our model might 
overestimate foreclosure risk. In panel C, we control for pre-crisis neighborhood 
observable mortgage risk with a simple time trend, all the coefficients are very similar to 
the ones in panel B, which justifies that the replacement of neighborhood by current year 
FE with foreclosures neighborhood trends. 
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Table 3.3: LTV Coefficients with and without Current Year by Tract FE's 
Panel A Two way 
  Act LTV tract price  Pred LTV tract price  Pred LTV county price  
VARIABLES w/o controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls 
70<LTV<90 0.0023287*** -0.0006754*** 0.0094944*** 0.0092757*** 0.0087747*** 0.0067810*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) 
90<LTV<110 0.0073034*** 0.0001689 0.0147982*** 0.0144971*** 0.0105973*** 0.0073530* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
110<LTV<130 0.0176194*** 0.0071824*** 0.0251207*** 0.0250580*** 0.0564681*** 0.0533839*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) 
130<LTV<150 0.0314153*** 0.0184797*** 0.0411484*** 0.0417026*** 0.0781633*** 0.0756871*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) 
LTV>150 0.0474154*** 0.0344638*** 0.0616135*** 0.0632366*** 0.0928643*** 0.0913423*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) 
Observations 1,628,101 1,628,101 1,627,411 1,627,411 1,717,729 1,717,729 
R-squared 0.029 0.032 0.027 0.031 0.027 0.031 
 
Panel B Three way 
       Act LTV tract price  Pred LTV tract price  Pred LTV county price  
VARIABLES w/o controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls 
70<LTV<90 0.0021803*** -0.0014919*** 0.0005240 -0.0003991 0.0017944 0.0008025 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
90<LTV<110 0.0069746*** -0.0020512*** 0.0029067 0.0011074 -0.0005550 -0.0029731 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
110<LTV<130 0.0168995*** 0.0030651** 0.0099781*** 0.0078126*** 0.0231275*** 0.0205730*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
130<LTV<150 0.0300970*** 0.0120558*** 0.0233913*** 0.0212580*** 0.0363452*** 0.0340357*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) 
LTV>150 0.0454099*** 0.0250934*** 0.0425396*** 0.0409812*** 0.0494007*** 0.0474374*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Observations 1,628,101 1,628,101 1,627,411 1,627,411 1,717,729 1,717,729 
R-squared 0.018 0.021 0.016 0.020 0.016 0.020 
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Table 3.3: Continued 
 
Panel C two way+Neighborhood trend controls 
     Act LTV tract price  Pred LTV tract price  Pred LTV county price  
VARIABLES w/o controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls 
70<LTV<90 0.0023512*** -0.0011961*** 0.0046905*** 0.0044554*** 0.0073998*** 0.0054525*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
90<LTV<110 0.0072172*** -0.0014583*** 0.0068650*** 0.0061098*** 0.0012490 -0.0031358 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) 
110<LTV<130 0.0168936*** 0.0036727*** 0.0127691*** 0.0118654*** 0.0294262*** 0.0237172*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
130<LTV<150 0.0298042*** 0.0127774*** 0.0254366*** 0.0248297*** 0.0404717*** 0.0339009*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) 
LTV>150 0.0445502*** 0.0254579*** 0.0408975*** 0.0407320*** 0.0426109*** 0.0353398*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.009) (0.008) 
Observations 1,628,101 1,628,101 1,627,411 1,627,411 1,717,729 1,717,729 
R-squared 0.029 0.032 0.028 0.032 0.028 0.032 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
     
As in Campbell, Giglio and Pathak (2011) and Gerardi, Rosenblatt, Willen and 
Yao (2012), the source of variation in our sample arises from the interaction of 
neighborhood, purchase quarter and current quarter. They remove variation within 
neighborhood over time with either fixed effects or trends, and their model are identified 
by the use of high frequency data over space, which provides within neighborhood 
variation. However, our neighborhood foreclosure risk instrument only varies by 
neighborhood by current quarter. In order to capture any non-parametric neighborhood 
foreclosure trends, we replace neighborhood by current quarter FE with pre-crisis 
neighborhood observable mortgage risk interacting with time trends. In this case, 
neighborhood foreclosure risk can be identified with our three sets of controls. The 
neighborhood combined with the purchase quarter component contains cross 
neighborhood variation in the distribution of loan to value ratios, and the purchase quarter 
combined with the current quarter component contains cross census tract variation in the 
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level of housing prices. The neighborhood trends of foreclosures component contains 
variation based on the timing of purchases because in some quarters there were more 
purchases than the others, and the later quarters during the pre-crisis period experience 
less housing price appreciation prior to the onset of the crisis and thus more severe equity 
loss in the crisis.  
We stress here that our neighborhood spillover effects can still be identified even 
if we control for neighborhood observables and allow for its varying over time. We 
control for neighborhood patterns of foreclosures by interacting pre-crisis neighborhood 
observable mortgage risk with a simple time trend. And our neighborhood level 
foreclosure risk measure varies dramatically between neighborhoods with similar pre-
crisis observables, so the spillovers explain foreclosure risks above and beyond these 
neighborhood specific trends.   
Table 3.4 presents the results of pseudo first stage regression of neighborhood 
actual fraction of negative equity on the foreclosure risk instruments. In particular, we 
regress fraction of houses falling in negative equity, fraction of houses falling in negative 
equity more than 30%, and average amount of negative equity for each tract-crisis year 
on those corresponding predicted values. It is clear that our neighborhood variables have 
strong prediction powers. Even after controlling for neighborhood trends, all the 
coefficients are positive and statistically significant. 
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Table 3.4: Pseudo First Stage 
 
Panel A  control for tract and current year FE 
VARIABLES avgneg avgneg30 avgnegamt 
fr_negltv_tract 0.6954168*** 
  
 
(0.040) 
  fr_negltv30_tract 
 
1.2661046*** 
 
  
(0.058) 
 avg_negamount_tract 
  
2.1747872*** 
   
(0.076) 
Observations 8,720 8,720 8,720 
R-squared 0.907 0.786 0.806 
    Panel B  control for tract and current year FE and Neighborhood year trends 
VARIABLES avgneg avgneg30 avgnegamt 
fr_negltv_tract 0.7722205*** 
  
 
(0.028) 
  fr_negltv30_tract 
 
0.5838814*** 
 
  
(0.042) 
 avg_negamount_tract 
  
1.0360678*** 
   
(0.052) 
Observations 8,720 8,720 8,720 
R-squared 0.856 0.808 0.813 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
3.6 Results 
 
The results for the OLS estimates are reported in Tables 3.5, 3.6 and 3.7. In this 
study we use linear probability models because of the two reasons: (1) Probit is not 
known to perform very well with a large numbers of fixed effects; (2) we want to have 
the most conservative standard errors by not imposing any assumption on the structures 
of the standard errors. We estimated the parameters of Equation (11) and (12) separately 
with three different sets of individual LTV controls: (1) Actual Current LTV based on 
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census tract price indices; (2) LTV instruments based on census tract price indices; (3) 
LTV instruments based on county price indices. From (1) to (3), the measures of 
individual equity status become more and more exogenous. 
Table 3.5 shows the results of these six specifications with and without the initial 
mortgage underwriting controls (whether the sale is an arm’s length transaction, whether 
there are subordinate liens, whether each loan was an adjustable rate or fixed rate 
mortgage, how long the house is and the dummy variables indicating the initial LTV). 
The top panel shows the results of two way FE regressions with neighborhood by 
purchase quarter FE and purchase quarter by current quarter FE. The coefficient of the 
neighborhood risk of foreclosure or predicted fractions of houses in negative equity are 
positive and significant for actual LTV with tract price indices and Predicted LTV with 
county price indices. Even though the neighborhood instrument constructed with tract 
price indices are not statistically significant, the coefficients have the right signs. All 
these results suggest that there exist some spillovers when we do not control for 
neighborhood patterns of foreclosures. As expected, all the coefficients of individual 
LTVs higher than 1.1 are of the expected signs and increase as LTVs go up. For example, 
the foreclosure risks increase from 0.007 to 0.047 when individual actual LTV increase 
from 0.9-1.1 to higher than 1.5. The bottom panel reports the same six models except by 
adding the neighborhood trends. Note that these positive spillover estimates disappear 
without any meaningful reduction in the precision of our estimates. The coefficients of 
neighborhood proxies for foreclosure risk even become negative. This table suggests that 
even though houses in the neighborhood with higher foreclosure risks are more likely to 
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receive NOD, this is due to neighborhood specific foreclosure trends not the spillovers in 
the number of homes at risk of foreclosure. 
Table 3.5: Neighborhood LTV Coefficients with and without Tract Trends 
Panel A without trends 
       Act LTV tract price  Pred LTV tract price  Pred LTV county price  
VARIABLES w/o controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls 
              
Fr. of  Neg. Eqty 0.0127991* 0.0257192*** 0.0029415 0.0021380 0.0496910*** 0.0502810*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) 
70<LTV<90 0.0023188*** -0.0007401*** 0.0093867*** 0.0091975*** 0.0086927*** 0.0066979*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
90<LTV<110 0.0072734*** 0.0000075 0.0146255*** 0.0143716*** 0.0097723*** 0.0065179* 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) 
110<LTV<130 0.0175682*** 0.0069351*** 0.0249303*** 0.0249196*** 0.0553253*** 0.0522274*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
130<LTV<150 0.0313241*** 0.0181152*** 0.0409197*** 0.0415364*** 0.0766477*** 0.0741535*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) 
LTV>150 0.0472495*** 0.0339010*** 0.0613261*** 0.0630276*** 0.0903588*** 0.0888071*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) 
Observations 1,628,101 1,628,101 1,627,411 1,627,411 1,717,729 1,717,729 
R-squared 0.029 0.032 0.027 0.031 0.027 0.03100 
       
Panel B with trends 
       Act LTV tract price  Pred LTV tract price  Pred LTV county price  
VARIABLES w/o controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls 
              
Fr. of Neg. Eqty -0.0049896 0.0047598 -0.0020170 -0.0014873 0.0149278 0.0148844 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
70<LTV<90 0.0023560*** -0.0012047*** 0.0047629*** 0.0045088*** 0.0073277*** 0.0053807*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
90<LTV<110 0.0072289*** -0.0014787*** 0.0069789*** 0.0061939*** 0.0011485 -0.0032360 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
110<LTV<130 0.0169093*** 0.0036443*** 0.0129037*** 0.0119646*** 0.0294771*** 0.0237680*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
130<LTV<150 0.0298238*** 0.0127415*** 0.0255926*** 0.0249447*** 0.0406257*** 0.0340546*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.006) 
LTV>150 0.0445653*** 0.0254217*** 0.0410681*** 0.0408578*** 0.0428140*** 0.0355423*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) 
Observations 1,628,101 1,628,101 1,627,411 1,627,411 1,717,729 1,717,729 
R-squared 0.029 0.032 0.028 0.032 0.02800 0.03200 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
    *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3. 6: Different Measures of Neighborhood Negative Equity with Foreclosure Trends at 
the Census Tract Level 
      Panel A 
        Act LTV tract price  Pred LTV tract price  Pred LTV county price  
VARIABLES 
w/o 
controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls 
w/o 
controls 
w/ 
controls 
              
Fr. of Neg. Eqty -0.0049896 0.0047598 -0.0020170 -0.0014873 0.0149278 0.0148844 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) 
Observations 1,628,101 1,628,101 1,627,411 1,627,411 1,717,729 1,717,729 
R-squared 0.029 0.032 0.028 0.032 0.028 0.032 
 
Panel B 
        Act LTV tract price  Pred LTV tract price  Pred LTV county price  
VARIABLES 
w/o 
controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls 
w/o 
controls 
w/ 
controls 
              
Fr. of Neg. Eqty 
30 -0.0086359 -0.0046973 -0.0061575 -0.0073313 0.0042875 0.0027673 
  (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) 
Observations 1,628,101 1,628,101 1,627,411 1,627,411 1,717,729 1,717,729 
R-squared 0.029 0.032 0.028 0.032 0.028 0.032 
 
Panel C 
        Act LTV tract price  Pred LTV tract price  Pred LTV county price  
VARIABLES 
w/o 
controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls 
w/o 
controls 
w/ 
controls 
              
Avg. amount of 
Neg. Eqty -0.0198050 -0.0098705 -0.0149207 -0.0169354 0.0093773 0.0065762 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020) 
Observations 1,628,101 1,628,101 1,627,411 1,627,411 1,717,729 1,717,729 
R-squared 0.029 0.032 0.028 0.032 0.028 0.032 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 3.7: Different Measures of Neighborhood Negative Equity with Foreclosure Trends 
at the Block group level  
Panel A 
        Act LTV tract price  Pred LTV tract price  Pred LTV county price  
VARIABLES w/o controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls 
              
Fr. of Neg. Eqty -0.0066903 -0.0007398 -0.004645 -0.005177 0.0096630 0.0087811 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
Observations 1,628,101 1,628,101 1,627,411 1,627,411 1,717,729 1,717,729 
R-squared 0.042 0.045 0.041 0.045 0.041 0.045 
Panel B 
        Act LTV tract price  Pred LTV tract price  Pred LTV county price  
VARIABLES w/o controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls 
              
Fr. of Neg. Eqty 30 -0.0009683 0.0014735 0.000214 -0.0010816 0.0101970* 0.0084081 
  (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Observations 1,628,101 1,628,101 1,627,411 1,627,411 1,717,729 1,717,729 
R-squared 0.042 0.045 0.041 0.045 0.041 0.045 
Panel C 
        Act LTV tract price  Pred LTV tract price  Pred LTV county price  
VARIABLES w/o controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls w/o controls w/ controls 
              
Avg. amount of 
Neg. Eqty -0.0053822 0.0006689 -0.0026454 -0.0051480 0.0193436* 0.0159170 
  (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) 
Observations 1,628,101 1,628,101 1,627,411 1,627,411 1,717,729 1,717,729 
R-squared 0.042 0.045 0.041 0.045 0.041 0.045 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
   *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
    
        
Table 3.6 shows the coefficient estimates for the same model as in Table 3.5 but 
with different measures of negative equity. Our goal is to see the results in Table 3.5 are 
robust when we move from neighborhood fraction of houses being in negative equity to 
neighborhood fraction of houses with negative equity more than 30% and the average 
amount of negative equity at the neighborhood. As expected, there are no spillovers in 
any of these models, and the results are also robust to the inclusion of original mortgage 
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underwriting controls. The coefficients of neighborhood foreclosure risks in all nine 
models are very small and not statistically significant, which confirm the non-existence 
of spillovers. 
Next, we want to see if the foreclosure spillovers exist at a lower level geography, 
the block group level, after controlling for neighborhood foreclosure trends. Mostly 
consistent with before, there are no spillovers when we use price controls at the census 
tract level. However, when we use price controls at the county level, all the coefficients 
are positive and two of them are even significant at the 0.1 level. This seemingly 
contradictory result is actually consistent with the previous studies about foreclosure 
price spillover effects. Previous studies show that price spillovers happen at a very small 
geographic area, which in turn should raise foreclosure rates in this neighborhood. When 
we control for individual equity proxies constructed with county price indices, we cannot 
remove the pricing spillovers at the census block group level. Thus the evidence of 
spillovers starts to appear when we go to a lower level of geography. 
 
3.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter studies whether there are contagion effects of foreclosure possibly 
due to the information or norms that are created by exposure to foreclosure of housing 
units at the neighborhood level. Our empirical study finds that significant neighborhood 
spillovers exist without controlling for neighborhood specific trends, but they go to zero 
and quite precisely estimated after allowing foreclosure pattern over time to vary by 
neighborhood observables. By carefully controlling for the neighborhood pricing changes, 
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we found robust evidence that there are no non-price spillovers with the inclusion of 
neighborhood foreclosure trends FE both at the census tract level and block group level. 
When we go to a smaller geographic area where we cannot control for pricing changes, 
houses are more likely to receive NOD in the neighborhood with higher foreclosure risks, 
which is consistent with the previous study that price spillover effects are very localized.  
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